Local approaches for a global water revolution : a case study of communal water management in Ladakh, India by Boyd, Natalie Denise
LOCAL APPROACHES FOR A GLOBAL WATER REVOLUTION:
A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNAL WATER MANAGEMENT IN LADAKH, INDIA
By
Natalie Denise Boyd
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts in 
International Development Studies
April, 2007, Saint Mary’s University, Halifax, Nova Scotia
Copyright © Natalie Denise Boyd, 2007
Approved: Dr. James Morrison
Supervisor
Approved: Dr. John Devlin
Reader
Date: April 25,2007
Printed on 100% Post-Consumer Recycled Paper







395 Wellington Street 
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 
Canada
Your file Votre reference 
ISBN: 978-0-494-29007-1 




395, rue Wellington 
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 
Canada
NOTICE:
The author has granted a non­
exclusive license allowing Library 
and Archives Canada to reproduce, 
publish, archive, preserve, conserve, 
communicate to the public by 
telecommunication or on the Internet, 
loan, distribute and sell theses 
worldwide, for commercial or non­
commercial purposes, in microform, 
paper, electronic and/or any other 
formats.
AVIS:
L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive 
permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives 
Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, 
sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public 
par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, preter, 
distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans 
le monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, 
sur support microforme, papier, electronique 
et/ou autres formats.
The author retains copyright 
ownership and moral rights in 
this thesis. Neither the thesis 
nor substantial extracts from it 
may be printed or otherwise 
reproduced without the author's 
permission.
L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur 
et des droits moraux qui protege cette these.
Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels de 
celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement 
reproduits sans son autorisation.
In compliance with the Canadian 
Privacy Act some supporting 
forms may have been removed 
from this thesis.
While these forms may be included 
in the document page count, 
their removal does not represent 
any loss of content from the 
thesis.
Conformement a la loi canadienne 
sur la protection de la vie privee, 
quelques formulaires secondaires 
ont ete enleves de cette these.
Bien que ces formulaires 
aient inclus dans la pagination, 
il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant.
i * i
Canada
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
DEDICATION
For my beloved husband and partner in all things, Benjamin, 
who has been with me for the entire journey, 
and to the people of Ladakh, 
from whom I have learned so much
11
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank the many friends that I made in Ladakh for their kindness, 
hospitality, and companionship. I am indebted to the following people who so 
generously took the time to share their stories with me; this work would not have been 
possible without their support.
The members of the Women’s Alliance of Ladakh in Leh
Tsewang Rigzin, and his son Thinles Wangial, of Lakrook House in Leh.
Sonam Dolma and family of Abagon House in Leh for their warm hospitality
Sonam Dawa (of the Ladakh Ecological Development Group), Chewang Norphel (of the 
Leh Nutrition Project), Tashi Tokmet (of the Ladakh Environment and Health 
Organization), and Aaron Dana (of Digital Mine) in Leh
Sonam Loldan and family of Spon House in the village of Saboo
Ishey Tsewang and family of Skyungdupa House and Lama Tenpa Wangchuck in the 
village of Matho
Diskit Dolker and family of Kalaksa House, Sonam Landol of Tongstoth House, and 
Lama Nagwang Chosphel, the Gompa chagzot, in Chemray village
Sonam Stanzin and Tsewang Dolma, and their son Stanzin Dorjey, of Karokpa House in 
Alchi village
Sonam Punchok and family of Togoche House in Hemis Shukpachan
I would also like to thank my supervisor, Jim Morrison, and my reader, John Devlin, for 
their efforts, contributions, and guidance. And much thanks to my family and friends for 
cheering me on.
The material presented here was collected with the generous financial support of the 
Government of India and the Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute, as well as both the Faculty 
of Graduate Studies and Research and the Student’s Association at Saint Mary’s 
University. In addition, I would like to thank Salomon Sports for providing footwear for 
the fieldwork component o f this research.
Please note that any misinformation contained in this document should be attributed to 
my own misunderstanding, not to any error on the part of those whom I interviewed.
iii




ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.........................................    Ill
CONTENTS............................................................................................................................. IV
LIST OF FIGURES.....................................  1
GLOSSARY OF TERMS  ..................................................................   2
ABSTRACT...............................................    3
1. WATER IN THE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT....................................  4
1.1 The Problem of Water: Scarcity, Consumption and Pollution...........................4
1.2 The Need for a Water Management Revolution...............................   7
1.3 Management of Common-Pool Resources...........................................................8
1.4 Communal Property Regimes: An Effective Management Alternative for 
Water......................................................................................................................   16
1.5 Research Methodology.........................................................................................18
1.5.1 Methodological Approach...................................     18
1.5.2 Methods of Data Collection........................................................................ 20
Qualitative...............................................................   20
Quantitative.....................................................................................................21
1.5.3 Selection of Research Sites and Participants..............................................21
1.6 Overview of the Chapters to Follow...................................................................25
2. HISTORY OF WATER MANAGEMENT IN INDIA................................................... 27
2.1 Introduction.............................     27
2.2 Ancient and Classical Periods....................................... 28
2.3 Pre-Colonial Period ......................................................................................... 32
2.4 Colonial Period.....................................................................................................36
2.5 Post-Colonial India................................................................  40
2.6 Changing Currents: Reasons for H ope ..................  44
3. CASE STUDY OF LADAKH  ...........   45
3.1. Ladakh: General Background.........................................................................  45
3.2 Leh District......................................................................................................... 54
3.2.1 Leh Block........................   56
Leh  ........................................................................................................ 56
Saboo .................   66








3.3 Conclusion................   95
4. DISCUSSION..............  ;............................................................. 96
4.1 The Impact of Resource Characteristics on Water Management..................... 96
4.1.1 Renewability............................................................  96
4.1.2 Scale...............................................................................................................97
4.1.3 Cost of Measurement....................................................................................98
4.2 The Impact of Resource User Characteristics on Water Management............99
4.3 Institutional Characteristics: Past and Present................   100
4.3.1 Clearly Defined Boundaries.................................................  101
4.3.2 Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local 
conditions  ...............................................................................................103
Time Restrictions..........................................................................................103
Place Restrictions....................................   104
Quantity Restrictions..........................................................................   104
Provision Rules.............................................................................................105
4.3.3 Collective-choice arrangements ........................................................... 106
4.3.4 Monitoring................................................................................................... 106
4.3.5 Graduated sanctions................................................................................... 107
4.3.6 Conflict-resolution mechanisms  ....................................................109
4.3.7 Minimal recognition of rights to organize  ...................................110
4.4 Current Challenges to Sustaining the Ladakhi Institution.............................. 110
4.5 Overcoming Challenges..................................................................................... 124
4.6 Into the Future: The Way Forward................................................................... 126
REFERENCES......................................   129
APPENDIX.................................................................................................................. 137
v
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Location of Ladakh within India and South Asia.................................................45
Figure 2: Location of Ladakh within the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir.....................49
Figure 3: Map of Leh District................................................................................................. 55
Figure 4: Map of Leh Block.....................................................,............................................. 56
Figure 5: Public stand post ....................................................... .......... .............................. 60
Figure 6: PHE water delivery truck........................................................................................60
Figure 7: Map of Saboo showing chutso divisions............................................................... 66
Figure 8: Zing Yognos when empty.......................................................................................69
Figure 9: Overflow outlet and locking valve on Zing Yognos............................................ 69
Figure 10: Yura running between footpath and field........................................................   71
Figure 11: Map of Kharu Block..............................................................................................74
Figure 12: Hand-pump in front of Kalakska house...............................................................76
Figure 13: An official thetse........................................ ........................................................ . 78
Figure 14: Map of Khaltse Block................................ ......................................................... 84
Figure 15: Workers replacing previous mud and stone yuras with cement yuras...............88
Figure 16: Piped-water system........................ 89
Figure 17: The village of Hemis Shukpachan....................................................................... 93
Figure 18: Solid waste in Leh yura..........................     113
Figure 19: Recent precipitation trends in Leh......................................................................122
Figure 20: House submerged by flooding in the village of Rong, Nubra Block 123
Please note that all photographs were taken by the researcher during the field research 
period in Ladakh between July and October 2006.
1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Bes = the sharing of labour
Chagzot = manager of the gompa
Chang = local brew made from fermented barley
Chu = water
Chu dzomsa = confluence of two rivers (literally ‘water meeting place’)
Chumik = water from a spring 
Churpun = water manager
Chutso = group of households organized to help manage water in a specific area of a 
village
Dol chu = first irrigation, given once shoots appear 
Goba = traditional village headman 
Gompa = monastery 
La = pass (mountain)
Lama = Buddhist monk
Lhangsde = system of sharing resources (i.e. farm tools and draft animals)
Katak = white scarf given in ceremonies of homage, appreciation, welcome, departure 
Kangri = glacier-covered mountain 
Kha = snow
Khachu = water from snowmelt
Khyak chu = frozen water (remainder of winter water in tokpo and zings)
Non chu = third irrigation, given once crops are strong and healthy 
Pabchu = system of sharing water between Sakti and Chemray villages (literally ‘to bring 
down water’)
Pashpun = cooperative group of households 
Phu = alpine pasture
Puja = holy offering to the village oracles 
Rares = community turn-taking for animal herding 
Ri = mountain
Sha = meat (typically sheep or goat)
Shak chu = second irrigation, given once shoots become dry and yellow in colour
Ska = closure, comprised of boulders and sod, to divert water to a particular yura or field
Spang = marsh
Ston chu = autumn water
Tha chu = pre-ploughing water
Thetse = carved wooden seal (formerly called ‘pangya’ in Chemray, or ‘skargya’ in Leh)
Tokpo = principal snow- or glacier-fed stream of a village
Tso = lake, pond
Yura = irrigation channel
Yurgo = head of yura
Zing = man-made water storage reservoir
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ABSTRACT
LOCAL APPROACHES FOR A GLOBAL WATER REVOLUTION:
A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNAL WATER MANAGEMENT IN LADAKH, INDIA
By
Natalie Denise Boyd
The mismanagement of water is one of the most pressing development problems of the 
day. This research argues that, in some circumstances, an often-neglected form of water 
management, communal property management, can offer a viable solution to this 
problem. India has a rich history of traditional water management. Within India, the 
region of Ladakh was examined as an example of successful communal water 
management. Drawing from the experience of six communities in Ladakh, the case study 
method was employed to investigate what institutional characteristics have enabled 
Ladakh’s long-enduring success. Factors that challenge Ladakh’s continued success, and 
how these challenges may be overcome, are identified. The Ladakhi experience shows 
that communal water management is a viable management regime that can provide 
insights into how to improve the way in which water is currently managed.
April, 2007
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It is a fact o f  the human condition that we can 
achieve none o f our goals without water.
-  Chaturvedi, 2006:63
1. WATER IN THE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT
1.1 The Problem of Water; Scarcity. Consumption and Pollution
Water is vital for life. Next to air, it is the most essential resource for humans. 
Without it, we die. Approximately every fifteen seconds, someone in the world dies from 
a water-related illness; ninety percent of these deaths are children under five, and most 
are in developing countries (World Health Organization, 2004). Unfortunately, over one 
billion people lack ready access to potable water (United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], 2006). Acknowledging this calamity, United 
Nations Millennium Development Goal (MDG) number seven pledges to half this figure 
within this decade. The UN has labelled 2005-2015 the decade of action to achieve 
‘Water for Life,’ noting that accomplishing the MDG of water is vital for achieving a 
variety of other MDGs (UNESCO, 2006). However, the UN itself admits that the 
organization has a history of setting ambitious global targets, where “all too frequently, 
these have not included detailed enough implementation plans or the necessary financial 
resources ... and were rarely met in full” (UNESCO, 2006:29). Thus far, progress on 
reaching the MDGs has been patchy and slow, which unfortunately means that achieving 
MDG number seven by 2015 is less than likely (UNESCO, 2006).
Mahatma Gandhi once said, “[t]he earth has enough for the needs of all, but not 
for the greed of a few” (Shiva, 2002:xv). It must be kept in mind though, that we live on 
a planet with finite resources. Of the total volume of water on Earth, most is saltwater 
and freshwater resources account for only 2.5 percent; most of this 2.5 percent is locked
4
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in polar icecaps, permanent snowcover, or deep underground, leaving less than a mere 1 
percent of the world’s freshwater, or less than 0.01 percent of all water on Earth, easily 
accessible for human use (Gleick, 1993). However, human use is not uniform across the 
world. The average British citizen uses approximately 200 litres of water daily and the 
average American citizen 500 litres. In contrast, the average Mozambican citizen uses
9.3 litres per day, and the average Gambian citizen a mere 4.5 litres (Black, 2004a). Fifty 
litres has been suggested as the basic water requirement per person per day, and thirty the 
bare minimum necessary to cover basic needs, with five litres allotted for consumption 
and the remaining twenty-five litres for hygiene (New Internationalist, 2003). However, 
as the above figures indicate, many of the world’s people go without even the bare 
minimum, while others consume far beyond their need.
Today, around 1.2 billion people, or almost one-fifth of the world’s population, 
live in areas of physical water scarcity (Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], 2006). 
By 2025, an estimated 1.8 billion people will face absolute water scarcity, while two- 
thirds of the world’s population will live in water-stressed areas (FAO, 2006).1 By 2050, 
the world population is expected to increase by fifty percent to 9 billion, placing 
increased demands on existing resources (United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, 2000). However, population growth alone does not explain the problem 
of water scarcity. “Water use has been growing at more than twice the rate of population 
increase in the last century” (FAO, 2006:2). In many countries, water demand and 
profligate use continues to rise, while water levels of lakes, rivers and aquifers continue 
to fall (De Villiers, 2003).
1 Absolute water scarcity is defined as less than 1,000 m3/person/year, while water-stress is defined as 
1,000-1,700 m3/person/year (Falkenmark, 2004).
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The problem of water scarcity is further compounded by human pollution. “The 
industrialized life-style has inflicted on the world’s waterways a burden of untreated 
sewage, pesticides, and industrial waste, endangering both the health of people and the 
health of the aquatic environment itself’ (Black, 2004b: 137). As potable water is lost to 
irreversible contamination, the amount of freshwater available to humans, and other 
animals, decreases, and the problem of scarcity is exacerbated.
There are countless examples of human overuse of water, in the form of 
unsustainable consumption and pollution of the resource. Though physical water scarcity 
does exist in some arid environments with dense human populations, ample evidence 
suggests that the global “water crisis is primarily a water management crisis” (Figueres, 
Rockstrom, & Tortajada, 2003:229). The water management disaster of the Aral Sea 
represents one of the worst examples of human-caused ecological catastrophe. The Aral 
Sea used to be the world’s fourth largest lake until mismanagement and decades of 
careless irrigation, by a variety of Central Asian countries, resulted in its demise. As the 
input waters to the sea were diverted for irrigation,
[t]he level of the lake fell, salinity rose, and vast expanses of the lake bed 
were exposed. As a result, the fishing industry collapsed, islands that had 
served as wildlife refuges became peninsulas, the fish and aquatic birds died, 
vast clouds of salts and chemical fertilizer residues blew from the lake bed 
onto neighbouring lands, groundwater salinity rose, and the local climate was 
altered. The effects on the local human population were catastrophic.
(De Villiers, 2003:46)
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Agriculture is the number-one'user of freshwater worldwide; approximately 70 percent of 
all water withdrawn from lakes, rivers, and aquifers is used for irrigation (Brooks, 2003; 
FAO, 2006). If repeating disasters, like the Aral Sea, is to be avoided, better water 
management is needed; because agriculture accounts for so much of human water usage, 
particular attention must be focused on ensuring better water management practices for 
irrigation.
1.2 The Need for a Water Management Revolution
Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland of Norway helped characterize sustainable 
development as paths of social, economic and political progress that meet “the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987:8). Like Gandhi 
said, the Earth has enough water for us all, however, how the Earth’s water resources are 
currently being managed, has resulted in the current failure to meet the needs of a large 
percentage of its citizens, and the diminished likelihood that future generations will be 
able to meet their needs. In many cases, “such mismanagement has contributed to 
increasing poverty and a deteriorating quality of life,” particularly for the citizens of 
developing countries (Figueres, Rockstrom, & Tortajada, 2003:232). Further, it is often 
“the remote habitats of tribal or aboriginal peoples who have least political and economic 
clout to defend their interests which are most at risk” (Black, 2004b: 133).
The world needs a revolution in the way we manage water resources. Central to 
this revolution must be an understanding that there are many effective ways to manage 
water resources, and that the most effective management regime will vary depending on 
the particular circumstances and characteristics of a given area.
7
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1.3 Management of Common-Pool Resources
Water, inter alia fish and timber, is an example of a common-pool resource. A 
common-pool resource is defined as “a valued natural or human-made resource or facility 
that is available to more than one person and subject to degradation as a result of 
overuse...for which exclusion from the resource is costly and one person’s use subtracts 
from what is available to others” (Dietz, Dolsak, Ostrom, & Stem, 2002:18).2 Though 
common-pool resources share the characteristics of subtractability and difficulty of 
exclusion, they often differ with regard to a series of other characteristics, namely 
renewability, scale, and cost of measurement (Dolsak & Ostrom, 2003). Subtractability 
and the difficulty of exclusion create two main potential problems in terms of incentives 
for humans using common-pool resources, the problem of overuse, and the free-rider 
problem, respectively. The problem of overuse includes both overharvesting, or taking 
too much of a resource out, and pollution, or putting too much of a contaminant into the 
resource, while the free-rider problem refers to the fact that the benefits of maintaining 
and improving both the resource and the rules that govern the resource are received by all 
users, though some users will have not made any contributions. While the term 
‘common-pool’ focuses on characteristics of the resource itself, ‘common property’ 
suggests a type of management regime constructed by humans to regulate the use of the 
resource (Dietz et al., 2002). Given that the physical characteristics of a particular 
common-pool resource are difficult, if not impossible, to alter, solutions to the problems
2 Though common-pool resources share the problem o f difficult exclusion with public goods (leaving
public goods also susceptible to the free-rider problem), they differ in regard to subtractability, or rivalness.
With common-pool resources, an individual’s use o f  the resource (fish, water, timber, etc.) subtracts from
what is available to other users, both in the present and into the future. On the other hand, one person’s use
o f a public good, such as a lighthouse, does not reduce the possibility for an infinite number o f other
persons to use the same lighthouse (Dietz et al., 2002).
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posed by overuse and free-riding, must necessarily involve alteration within the behavior 
of resource users. Overuse and free-riding can be overcome if agreed upon rules are 
established which regulate individual actions and permit social costs to be balanced 
against social benefits (Dietz et al., 2002).
Common-pool resources are typically regulated by one of four types of property 
rights regimes: 1) open-access, 2) communal property, 3) state property, or 4) private 
property (Berkes & Farvar, 1989). With open-access property rights regimes, no 
individual or group owns the resource, and there is an absence of enforced property 
rights; no rules exist related to access or amount of harvest of the resource, permitting 
free access to everyone. In communal property rights regimes, resource rights are held 
by a group of users who can exclude others and determine how the resource should be 
used. Among state property rights regimes, ownership and management control is held 
by a government or crown who can regulate or subsidize the use of public resources. In 
private property rights regimes, resource rights are held by an individual or firm who can 
exclude others and who can decide the appropriate usage of the resource (Berkes & 
Farvar, 1989; Shen, 2003). However, most property regimes in practice do not obey the 
strict categories mentioned, and instead exhibit aspects of more than one regime in their 
attempts to manage common-pool resources.
Three broad metaphors are often cited to explain the difficulty of managing 
common-pool resources, predicting suboptimal use and/or ultimate destruction of the 
resource. In Hardin’s (1968) seminal work, The Tragedy, o f the Commons, he argues that 
left to their own devices, humans will ultimately bring tragedy to the commons, and 
therefore, the only way to own and manage common-pool resources was either by state or
9
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private means. Secondly, Olson argues that “rational, self-interested individuals will not 
act to achieve their common or group interests” (Olson, 1965:2). Finally, self-interested 
behaviour results in classical Prisoner’s Dilemmas, where rational actions by all parties 
involved result in lower utility for everyone -  the Nash equilibrium.3 These three 
metaphors, though compelling, do not fully explain all common-pool resource 
management scenarios in practice.
Hardin’s arguments stimulated much subsequent research which challenged the 
validity of his claims, and though highly influential, his work has been criticized as 
oversimplified. “He missed the point that many social groups, including the herders on 
the commons that provided the metaphor for his analysis, have struggled successfully 
against threats of resource degradation by developing and maintaining self-governing 
institutions” (Dietz, Ostrom & Stem, 2003:1907). Olson also missed the point. Contrary 
to Olson’s assumptions regarding human motivation, many communities emphasize co­
operation and “responsibility to the community, rather than the unbridled individualism 
[and competition] glorified in some Western industrial cultures” (Berkes & Farvar, 
1989:3-5). Thus, many individuals do not display the rational self-interest, which Olson 
suggests prohibits successful collective action. While self-interested behaviour can 
create Prisoner’s Dilemmas, this need not always be the case. A variety of complex 
social arrangements and behaviour (for example, community sanctions) can serve to alter 
the payouts in the game model, such that the game no longer resembles that of a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, even if players are self-interested. Further, the Prisoner’s Dilemma
3 See for example, any introductory Economics textbook on game theory, such as Frank, B., & Bemanke, 
B. (2000). Principles o f  Microeconomics. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.
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assumes that the game is only played once. When the game is played in perpetuity, 
individual player’s actions may change as their knowledge of the game changes.
Hardin’s thesis, and the subsequent work of resource economists in the 1960s and 
1970s, argued that unitary ownership of common-pool resources, by either the 
government or a private owner, would result in their improved management, and led to 
many policy innovations in this vein. The major policy reform in developing countries 
was to nationalize ownership of common-pool resources, from forests to in-shore 
fisheries ownership, by dismantling the existing regimes and transferring control to 
government (Dietz et al., 2002).
Extensive research and experience since 1968 shows that these transfers of 
property rights were sometimes disastrous for the resources they were 
intended to protect. Instead of creating a single owner with a long-term 
interest in the resource, nationalizing common-pool resources typically led to 
(1) a rejection of any existing indigenous institutions — making the actions of 
local stewards to sustain a resource illegal; (2) poor monitoring of resource 
boundaries and harvesting practices because many governments did not have 
the resources to monitor the resources to which they asserted ownership; and 
(3) de facto open access conditions and a race to use of the resources. (Dietz 
et al., 2002:11)
Additionally, state-run enterprises have often been criticized as inefficient and their 
infrastructure deteriorating, since they lack the monetary incentives to achieve efficiency 
and the capital necessary for maintenance (Adam, 2004; Adam, 2005; Barlow & Clarke, 
2004; Hacher, 2004; Reardon, 2004). Thus, the historical experience shows that, in many
11
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situations, “a de jure state state-owned resource turns into a de facto open-access 
resource” and its viability as a common-property resource management regime 
diminishes accordingly (Dolsak & Ostrom, 2003:20). This has been particularly 
pronounced in the developing country context, where governments are much more 
resource-constrained and may lack the political power to enforce human restraint.
As a solution to the failure of some state property regimes to successfully manage 
common-pool resources, privatization was advanced and implemented. The 
implementation of private property regimes, for common pool resources, it was argued, 
would result in increased equity in provision and increased efficiency in operation and 
maintenance (Perry, Rock & Seckler, 1997). The rise of neo-liberalism has served to 
further bolster the idea that privatization is the most appropriate means of managing 
common-pool resources. Consistent with this is the recognition of water as an economic 
good; proponents of privatization have argued that only when water resources are valued 
monetarily will the conservation and protection of water resources ensue (Perry et al., 
1997). Many common-pool resources have been privatized, though the subsequent 
results have not been uniformly successful. In many cases, not only have the efficiency 
and infrastructure gains not been met, but undesired outcomes have also occurred. The 
private sector is profit-driven, which often results in pricing mechanisms that exclude the 
poor (Barlow & Clarke, 2004; Public Citizen, 2003; Vilas, 2004). “Poor people 
commonly pay ten times as much per litre for water of questionable quality as do richer 
people for water of good quality” (Brooks, 2003:30). Additionally, some contend that 
“the introduction of private property ... leads to the deterioration of common-pool 
resources and communities” (Dolsak & Ostrom, 2003:337). Due to the mixed results of
12
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these historical experiences, the argument that unitary ownership, in the form of either a 
state or private property regime, was the logical management regime for all common- 
pool resources, was called into question.
As a result of this questioning, a rich literature of case studies documenting 
hundreds of examples of long-term sustainable management of common-pool resources 
emerged. A review of this literature shows that, under some conditions, local groups can 
create communal property regimes to effectively manage common-pool resources, such 
that outcomes are much better than what Hardin’s tragedy predicted. Where successful, 
local groups have created communal property regimes by establishing effective, local, 
self-governing resource institutions (Dietz et al., 2003). “Although these institutions 
have not always succeeded, neither have Hardin’s preferred alternatives of private or 
state ownership” (Dietz et al., 2003:1907). However, Hardin was correct that “[fjreedom 
in a commons brings ruin to all” (Hardin, 1968:371). That is, these successful 
institutions cannot be characterized as open-access, where there is a free-for-all for 
resource use, but rather, are characterized as communal property regimes, where there are 
a set of norms and regulations in place to control resource usage.4
Ostrom (1990) formulates a list of ‘design principles’ (essential elements or 
conditions) to explain the success of long-enduring communal property institutions in 
sustaining their common-pool resources, and ensuring users’ compliance with norms, 
generation after generation. Ostrom (1990) lists these principles, with the caveat that 
they may be neither necessary nor sufficient conditions to achieving these successful
4 Where a common-pool resource, such as water, is plentiful, an open-access property rights regime can 
provide a viable means o f  regulating the resource, or rather that regulation becomes unnecessary, however 
there are extremely few examples remaining today o f resources which are truly open and freely available to 
everyone (Shen, 2003).
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institutions, just that her analysis shows their prevalence in numerous case studies of 
successful communal property regimes. The design principles are as follows:
1. Clearly defined boundaries
Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from 
the CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself.5
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of 
resource units are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring 
labor, material, and/or money.
3. Collective-choice arrangements
Most individuals affected by operational rules can participate in modifying 
the operational rules.
4. Monitoring
Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriate behavior, are 
accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators.
5. Graduated sanctions
Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed 
graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the 
offense) by other appropriators, by officials accountable to these 
appropriators, or by both.
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas 
to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and 
officials.
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize
The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not 
challenged by external governmental authorities. (Ostrom, 1990:90)
5 Ostrom abbreviates common-pool resource as CPR.
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In addition to the design principles for institutions, a series of factors which facilitate 
institutional effectiveness are set out:
1. the resources and use of the resources by humans can be monitored, and the 
information can be verified and understood at relatively low cost (e.g., trees 
are easier to monitor than fish, and lakes are easier to monitor than rivers);
2. rates of change in resources, resource-user populations, technology, and 
economic and social conditions are moderate;
3. communities maintain frequent face-to-face communication and dense 
social networks -  sometimes called social capital -  that increase the 
potential for trust, allow people to express and see emotional reactions to 
distrust, and lower the cost of monitoring behavior and inducing rule 
compliance;
4. outsiders can be excluded at relatively low cost from using the resource 
(new entrants add to the harvesting pressure and typically lack 
understanding of the rules; and
5. users support effective monitoring and rule enforcement. (Dietz et al., 
2003:1908)
Further, attributes of both individual common-pool resource users and a group of users, 
as a whole, influence institutional effectiveness; the preferences and assets of individuals, 
and the size, cohesion, trust, and homogeneity of groups all affect the institutions 
governing common-pool resources (Dolsak & Ostrom, 2003).
“Empirical studies show that no single type of property regime works efficiently, 
fairly and sustainably in relation to all common pool resources, including water 
resources” (Shen, 2003:148). There will be scenarios where state or private property 
regimes perform well and perhaps even more efficiently than communal property 
regimes. Likewise, there are scenarios where communal property regimes are the 
preferable management type. However, there is a strong tendency within global 
development policy to ignore communal property management regimes (Dietz et al.,
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2003). To ignore communal property regimes when considering appropriate 
management regimes for common-pool resources is to potentially overlook useful tools, 
viable methods, and centuries of experience that may be quite useful for policy makers.
1.4 Communal Property Regimes: An Effective Management Alternative for Water
While different property regimes necessarily suggest a particular type of 
ownership, it is the management aspects of a regime that are the focus of this research. 
For example, it is possible to have state ownership of a resource, and communal 
management of the same resource. In some communal property regimes, the common- 
pool resource may not be legally owned by the community, however it is managed by the 
community. For the purposes of this research, the particular owner of the common-pool 
resource is not the focus, rather it is the community-based norms and rules, which impact 
how the common-pool resource is used that form the focus of this research. Community 
is “defined as some geographically delineated unit within a larger society” that uses a 
certain common-pool resource (Berg, 2004:260). The particular community-based norms 
and rules that are investigated in this research are the traditional water management 
practices of a community in Ladakh, northern India. The term ‘traditional’ defines 
practices, which have had “historical continuity among a group of people” (Berkes & 
Farvar, 1989:11). Throughout the subsequent chapters, the terms community-based 
management, traditional management, and communal property management are used 
synonymously.
The general purpose of this research is to investigate communal property regimes 
in the management of the common-pool resource, water. The decision to study the 
management of water was made on the basis of its importance as a development issue
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and of the current status of water management practices (as discussed in Sections 1.1 and 
1.2). Specifically, it was the management of water in rural areas of developing countries 
that was of particular concern to the researcher. “About 900 million poor people -  or 
three-quarters of the world’s 1.2 billion poorest people -  live in remote, rural areas...” 
(United Nations Human Settlement Programme [UNHABITAT], 2004). In rural areas of 
developing countries, populations tend to be sparse, dispersed and inaccessible, 
challenging the effectiveness of state and private property regimes in the management of 
water resources in the rural locale (Black, 2004b; UNHABITAT, 2004). Section 1.3 of 
this chapter suggests that communal property regimes may be a viable water management 
alternative in a variety of settings, including rural areas. In an attempt to find 
environmentally sound rural water management strategies, the experience of Ladakh was 
discovered as an example of a long-enduring, rural, communal property water 
management regime. Ladakh was chosen as a case study for this precise reason. Further, 
Ladakh was also chosen for this research because it is a water scarce region. Though 
water scarce, Ladakhis have been able to survive for centuries in a water scarce, and 
rather inhospitable, environment by employing traditional water harvesting technologies 
and management systems. Preliminary research suggested that these systems increased 
sustainability (both ecologically and economically), increased distributional equity, and 
led to community development (Centre for Science and Environment [CSE], 1997). The 
guiding rationale for studying Ladakh is that, if Ladakhis can succeed in such water 
scarce conditions, then other communities could potentially succeed also.
Acknowledging that Ladakh has successfully managed scarce water resources for 
centuries, the primary purpose of this research was to determine what technological and
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institutional characteristics facilitated Ladakh’s success in the past. The research then 
sought to ascertain whether these characteristics have been maintained in the present, or 
if there are factors that challenge the viability of common property resource management 
in Ladakh presently and into the future. Next, the research sought to address if and how 
these challenges could be overcome. Finally, the research sought to determine what the 
Ladakhi experience could offer other communities. That is, if why and how Ladakhis 
have been successful can be elucidated, then perhaps knowledge of these ‘best practices’ 
can be transferred to other communities struggling to achieve more effective water 




In order to gain trust, connections, and entry into Ladakhi society (communities in 
Ladakh), a relationship was established, over the course of a year leading up to the 
research, with an international non-go vemmental organization (NGO) that had over 
thirty years experience working in the region of Ladakh. In exchange for the promise of 
assistance gaining entry, making connections with informants and participants, and 
providing a translator for interviews, the researcher volunteered for this NGO for several 
months, both in Canada, prior to departure, and in Ladakh, upon arrival. Limited 
assistance was eventually provided for establishing initial connections, but beyond that, 
the NGO’s promises were not upheld. In fact, a translator was never provided, which 
significantly compromised the research. Significant adjustments had to be made to the 
intended methodological approach.
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It was intended that the methodological approach of this field research would be 
mixed methods, with a quantitative focus. The main strategy of inquiry was intended to 
be the survey, specifically employing structured questionnaires to gather information on 
the water management system of several communities in Ladakh. Along with no longer 
having a translator, it was decided that, in any case, structured questionnaires would have 
been too formal a data collection method. It was suspected that, if questionnaires had
been used, trust would have been breached, as suspicions would have been raised
\
regarding the high level of formality. Additionally, for a population with significant 
illiteracy (in both Ladakhi and English), written questionnaires would be barring to many 
participants, and even for those who could read, it would be heavily taxing and time- 
consuming for them to decipher. In order to minimize the burden on those participating 
in this research, and to maximize their comfort-level, it was decided that semi-structured 
interviews would be the most culturally appropriate method of data collection.
The methodological approach, which was actually used, was primarily qualitative 
in nature. Specifically, the qualitative strategy of the case study was employed (Creswell, 
2003). The case study strategy was chosen because it makes use of a multitude of 
research methods providing an in-depth study of a particular program, process or 
institution (in this case, the Ladakhi water management system), bounded by time and 
activity (Stake, 1995). The case study strategy was also chosen as an appropriate tool to 
explain causal factors and provide insights into a theoretical proposition (Berg, 2004). In 
this research, the theoretical proposition is the viability of communal property regimes 
for water management. The causal factors include the institutional design principles, user 
and resource characteristics, discussed in Section 1.3. Further, the case study strategy
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provides rich and detailed information which can be useful for generalizing the research 
findings from the individual case study to other development situations (Berg, 2004).
1.5.2 Methods of Data Collection
Typical of most case studies, a number of data-gathering methods were used, 
though semi-structured interviews formed the basis of this research. Other qualitative 
methods, such as researcher observation and document analysis, and, to a very limited 
extent, quantitative methods of data collection and analysis, such as census and 
meteorological data, were also employed.
Qualitative
• Semi-structured Interviews: Lying at the midpoint along the continuum of 
structure in interviewing, semi-structured interviews typically entail a set of 
predetermined questions, in a predetermined order, but allow for the freedom to 
digress, reorder the questions, and/or adjust the level of language or wording of 
the questions (Laws, 2003). One-to-one in-person interviews were conducted, 
which called for oral responses by the participants to both closed- and open-ended 
questions6, and allowed for the aforementioned flexibility. The researcher’s 
interviewing skills improved as the research progressed, and thus the information 
for some communities is more complete than for others.
• Observations: Visual examinations of objects (i.e. water infrastructure), processes, 
relationships and people were made, and these observations were recorded as field 
notes. For example, how and when people divert water to their fields was 
examined. “By directly observing what happens, the researcher can check
6 See Appendix for a sample o f  the types o f questions that were asked during these interviews.
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whether what people say they do or think is reflected in their actual behaviour” 
(Laws, 2003:304).
• Text and Image Data: Various documents (including published sources) and 
imagery that pertain to the Ladakh’s water management, such as maps, diagrams, 
and photographs of the communities were acquired from a variety of sources and 
carefully studied. Text and image data contribute to providing a more complete 
picture of the research problem by using all the methods available (Bogdan & 
Taylor, 1975).
Quantitative
• Census Data: Population data was utilized to obtain demographic statistics (such 
as size, growth, density and distribution) for the various Ladakhi communities 
studied. The Indian government collects this information every ten years; the last 
census poll in India was in 2001 (Census India, 2005).
• Meteorological data: Statistics regarding the temperature, precipitation, and 
weather patterns in the Ladakh region were collected from a variety of sources 
and analyzed for trends.
1.5.3 Selection of Research Sites and Participants
This study was confined to the region of Ladakh within the district of Leh. Leh 
District was chosen as it is this area in the central Indus Valley which is considered the 
‘heartland’ of Ladakh (Loram, 2004). Because of the politically sensitive nature of the 
region, the research was restricted to the Leh, Kharu, and Khaltse Blocks of Leh District.
Communities within Leh District were selected according to a variety of 
characteristics they possessed. To determine if proximity to or from Leh town, the
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capital of the region, was a factor that affected the integrity of the traditional water 
management system, Leh was chosen, as well as five different villages which were 
located at approximately 10, 25, 45, 70, and 85 kilometres in distance from Leh. The 
reader should bear in mind that the roads, including the main highways, in Ladakh are 
often windy, single-laned, dilapidated7, and sometimes unpaved. While a distance of 85 
kilometres on a highway in Canada might take approximately 50 minutes to travel by 
vehicle, in Ladakh, this same distance could be a full day’s journey by car, and even 
longer via other modes of transport (public buses, animals, by foot, etc.).
The villages chosen were in many ways determined by the insecurity and 
geography of the area. The desire was to study villages at varying proximity from Leh, 
but also in different directions from Leh -  to the north, to the south, to the east and to the 
west -  at different elevations (altitudes ranged from 3,250m -  3,700m) and with both 
northern and southern aspects. However, directly north of Leh is a stretch of road over 
the Khardung La that descends on the other side into the Nubra Valley. Nubra is one of 
the restricted areas where special permits are required. Southeast of Nubra Block lies 
Durbuk Block and Nyoma Block, also sensitive border regions where permits are 
required. With these extra logistical considerations, safety issues, heavy army presence 
and check points along the way, it was decided that the research would not be conducted 
in either of the Nubra, Durbuk or Nyoma Blocks. Directly south of Leh lies another 
geographic barrier, the Stok Mountain Range, and as a result, this research was confined 
to the corridor along the Indus River, to the northwest of Leh and to the southeast of Leh, 
throughout the Leh, Kharu, and Khaltse Blocks.
7 Not only are the roads dilapidated, but equally are most o f  the vehicles, including both public buses and 
private taxis (probably often due to the state o f  the roads).
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Aspect refers to the direction to which a mountain slope faces. The aspect of a 
slope can produce very significant influences on its local climate, which can in turn 
influence snow melt, farming, et cetera. “In the Himalayas, this effect can be seen to an 
extreme degree, with south-facing slopes being warm, wet and forested, and north-facing 
slopes cold, dry but much more heavily glaciated” (Wikipedia, 2006). Thus, it was 
desirable to study both villages with a northern aspect and villages with a southern 
aspect, to see what, if any, impact aspect had on the water management systems. 
Therefore, within the three blocks, villages were selected accordingly.
Villages were selected that could be accessed by roads along bus routes because 
a) financial constraints were such that private taxis were not affordable, and instead 
public buses were relied upon for transportation to and from villages; b) travelling by bus 
allowed for most of the limited research time to be spent in the village rather than in 
transit by foot overland to more remote villages; and c) villages located along bus routes 
would increase the likelihood that some degree of English had penetrated the village, 
enabling easier communication. Having no translator posed a significant constraint to the 
research. In just a few short months, the researcher was able to learn the basics of the 
Ladakhi language to the point where conversation and comprehension in Ladakhi were 
made possible at a beginner level, however the ability level was not sufficient to conduct 
interviews solely in Ladakhi, and thus it was imperative to find participants with at least a 
basic level of proficiency in English. Therefore, not only did participants have to possess 
sufficient knowledge of the water management system, but they also had to be capable of 
explaining the system to the researcher. It is acknowledged that this selection criteria 
undoubtedly prevented certain participants from vocalizing their opinions and responses.
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Excluded participants are expected to have been those less inclined to possess English 
language skills, most likely the elderly, the young, the very poor, and the disabled 
members of each community. For the most part, villages were selected where 
connections with people from those villages had been made, or where an informant had 
connections, however, some external variables also posed constraints to these plans. For 
example, during July and August 2006, the region experienced some pretty severe 
weather, and as a result, many roads and bridges were washed out due to flooding, 
preventing access to certain villages.
Participants in this study were selected via snowball sampling. Through the use 
of a few initial informants, the researcher was able to identify a few initial participants 
with characteristics relevant to the study. These participants were interviewed and then 
asked for the names of other people who possessed these same characteristics. By asking 
these initial participants for referrals, the sample eventually ‘snowballs’ from a few 
participants to many (Berg, 2004). This procedure is an effective way to locate 
participants with certain attributes or characteristics and/or those who are difficult to 
reach (Berg, 2004). In this study, participants possessing two main attributes, both 
sufficient knowledge of the water management system and the capability of explaining 
the system to the researcher, were sought. Not only did the referred participants have to 
possess these two main attributes, but the villages where they lived also had to possess 
the necessary characteristics pertaining to their distance from Leh, direction from Leh, 
altitude, aspect, accessibility, et cetera. Some villages, for example Alchi and Hemis 
Shukpachan, had local phone service within the village, but external phone lines were 
either unavailable or inoperable, making it difficult to reach potential participants. The
24
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
use of snowball sampling in this study mitigated both of these obstacles for participant 
selection.
One of the constraints faced was the time-sensitive nature of the research to be 
conducted, in the region where it was to be conducted. The timing of the agricultural 
season, which generally begins with ploughing in April and ends with the harvest in 
September, is synchronized with the melting of snow in late spring and the falling of new 
snow in early autumn. In order to witness the water management system in action, it was 
vital then, to be in Ladakh conducting this field research during this short window of 
time. Additionally though, during the eight months of winter (between November and 
June), the two highways connecting Ladakh to the rest of India (the Leh-Srinagar and the 
Leh-Manali highways) remain closed, making access in and out of, and movement 
throughout, Ladakh extremely challenging (Monasterio, 2000). Therefore the time of 
year that this research could reasonably be conducted in Ladakh was virtually 
predetermined; this field research was conducted in Ladakh in the period between early 
July and early October, 2006. Thus, with only three months to work with, the number of 
villages to be studied, and the amount of time to be spent in each village, was limited. In 
the end, time was divided between Leh and five surrounding villages.
1.6 Overview of the Chapters to Follow
Following this introductory chapter, discussing water in the development context, 
the history of water management in India is examined in order to situate Ladakh within 
the broader Indian experience. In the third chapter, the case study of Ladakh is presented 
and the research results of the various communities investigated are described. Finally, 
in chapter four, the research results are analyzed and their significance explored in the
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context of the broader theoretical communal property discussion which was reviewed 
the first chapter.
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2. HISTORY OF WATER MANAGEMENT IN INDIA
2.1 Introduction
“India is experiencing a water crisis” (CSE, 2001). The problems are severe and 
widespread, and the following are but a few examples: a “growing frequency of pollution 
scares; of bottled water and ‘owning the rain’ scandals; the rapid rate of groundwater 
depletion; [and] the salinization of irrigated soil” (Black, 2004:133). The problem does 
not appear to be getting better. “Every third human being in the world without safe and 
adequate water supply is an Indian... [and].. .every fourth being on the planet dying of 
water-borne or water-related diseases is an Indian” (Sainath, 1996: 24-25). Rising water 
consumption patterns, along with population increases, will only serve to worsen India’s 
current water crisis.
But India has not always experienced water crisis, nor chronic water shortage. 
India has a rich history of water management. One of ancient history’s most advanced 
civilizations was Indian, flourishing on the basis of its ability to successfully develop 
advanced water management systems (CSE, 1997). Integral to this management were 
technologies and institutions that allowed Indians to harvest, concentrate, collect, divert, 
and store water in a sustainable and ecologically sound manner. It would not be an 
overstatement to say that “Indians have historically been the world’s greatest water 
harvesters” (CSE, 1997:25).
Thus, India possesses a plethora of knowledge, passed down over millennia, of 
water harvesting technologies and management systems that have worked in the past, but 
are currently either underemployed or are not employed at all. In India we find both the 
potential solutions to water problems, as well as those who most desperately need that
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knowledge to better their well-being -  we need not look elsewhere to solve India’s water 
crisis.
From the ancient Indus Valley Civilization, through the Age of Empires, and into 
modem day times, this chapter chronicles the history of water management in India. By 
carefully examining the history of water management in India, it is possible to find 
solutions to today’s problems in yesterday’s solutions. In particular, this chapter provides 
a historical backdrop from which to view the case study of Ladakh.
2.2 Ancient and Classical Periods
Approximately 10,000 years ago, as hunter-gatherer societies began to cultivate 
plants and domesticate animals in response to ecological conditions that diminished the. 
viability of their traditional food acquisition practices, agricultural/pastoral societies 
began to emerge in India (Gadgil & Guha, 1992). These agricultural communities 
involved a more substantial division of labour than those of the hunter-gatherers, and thus 
were more heterogeneous in nature, as people tended to specialize by the kind of tasks 
they performed (i.e. crafts, trade, administration, and fighting forces) (Gadgil & Guha, 
1992). Over the next 8,000 years, agricultural settlements spread across the Indian 
subcontinent, conquering hunter-gathering societies as they went (Possehl, 1982).
By about 2,500 BCE, the Indus Valley Civilization (Harappa) emerged as a 
conglomerate of many of these individual agricultural settlements (Kamra, 2005). The 
first evidence of water management in India is found from archaeological excavations of 
the Indus Valley Civilization period.8 This urban civilization, based on agriculture and 
trade, is thought to have been advanced in its water supply and sewage disposal systems.
8 It is likely that human settlements prior to this period did have some forms o f water management, in 
particular the ability to store water for later use in cisterns, as knowledge o f  cisterns appears to be present 
in the establishment o f  the earliest cities (CSE, 1997).
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Archaeological excavations suggest that wells dug for water were probably invented in 
Harappa, and revealed that, in one city, “every third house had a well” (CSE, 1997:19). 
Wells were often strategically situated at elevated locations within settlements, and 
evidence that the Harrapan Civilization was able to cultivate winter crops, indicates that 
these wells may have been used to irrigate the surrounding fields (CSE, 1997).
Approximately 2,000 BCE saw the climax of this flourishing civilization, but that 
was brought to a fairly abrupt end by the invasion of nomadic, horse-riding Indo-Aryans 
from Central Asia in about 1,500 BCE (Chakrabarty, 1986).9 The next 500 years 
witnessed the decline of the Harappan Civilization, and with it, the introduction of the 
Varna or caste system by the Aryans to the pre-Aryans. The fair-skinned invaders 
practiced rituals of purity and pollution, as well as strict endogamy (Kamra, 2005). 
These aspects of Aryan culture were revealed in the Vedic texts (or Vedas), providing a 
literary record of this time period, and the foundations of what is modern-day Hinduism. 
At first, the newly conquered, dark-skinned pre-Aryans were reduced to servants and 
assigned tedious and low-status tasks. They were not assimilated through exogamy, and 
as such, two separate groups, divided by complexion (or Varna), emerged. Later on 
though, due to a shortage of Aryan females, among other reasons, exogamy emerged as 
the Aryans began to mix with their conquered, particularly with the previously wealthy 
and higher classes of the pre-Aryans (Kamra, 2005). This fusion of cultures subsequently 
led to the division of the two Vamas into four, with the Aryan elites taking up the highest 
Varna of the Brahmans (priests), followed by the Kshatriyas (warriors). Next were the
9 Some Hindu nationalist scholars have argued that the Aryan Invasion theory is a myth, and that Aryans 
were not invaders, rather that they emanated from India itself, and thus were present on the subcontinent 
before the Harappan Civilization (see for example, (Frawley, n.d.)). Though this position has been strongly 
refuted (see for example, (Guha, 2005)), the debate continues, and thus merits acknowledgment.
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Vaishyas (traders), and those with the darkest complexion were reduced to the lowest 
status in the society and assigned to the Shudra (manual labourers)10 Varna (Dube, 2001). 
The initially nomadic, pastoral Vedic Aryans eventually settled and took to agriculture. 
This switch to agriculture necessitated a means of irrigating crops, and there is literary 
evidence of artificial water-channels used for irrigation in the Vedic period (Chakrabarty, 
1986). Thus a newly organized Vedic Aryan society emerged.
“Gradually the Aryans expanded their colonies,” and with this spread came a shift 
in the predominant belief system, as agriculture settlements enveloped the remaining 
areas inhabited by hunter-gather societies (Chakrabarty, 1986:254). The hunter-gatherers 
were conservation-oriented since they had strong incentives to maintain the resource base 
that was their source of food and livelihood. Consequently, hunter-gatherers worshipped 
the supernatural powers of trees, ponds, rivers and mountain peaks. In contrast, the 
colonizing Vedic Aryans had incentives for profligacy, as destruction of forests allowed 
for the further spread of agriculture as well as the subjugation of hunter-gatherers (Karve, 
1974).
Supernatural power would now no longer reside in specific trees, groves or 
ponds, but would be the more abstract forces of nature: earth, fire, wind, 
water, and sky, whose assistance could be invoked in the task of 
subordinating hunter-gatherers and colonizing their resource base. (Gadgil &
Guha, 1992:78)
Fire as a tool to clear the forest, and water as a tool for irrigation, became the principal 
forces of nature celebrated by Vedic Aryans. Indeed the principal deities worshipped
10 “However, nowhere [do] we find any scent o f untouchability with regard to these sudras in the Vedic 
period, which disfigured the Hindu society in the later period o f the Smrtis” (Chakrabarty, 1986:31).
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were Agni (the god of fire and guardian of humanity), Varuna (the god of ocean and 
bringer of rain), and Indra (the god of rain and thunder) (Chakrabarty, 1986). The main 
ritual of Yanja, or fire worship, emerged in conjunction with these deities. Yanja 
involved the burning of huge quantities of wood and animal fat (Thapar, 1984).
The belief systems of Buddhism and Jainism emerged in approximately 550 BCE 
in oppositional response to the wasteful practices of Vedic society, but did not gain pre­
eminence until later in the Mauryan Empire (Morrison, 2005). The Mauryan Empire, 
which flourished in approximately 320 BCE, established a new form of territorial control 
over living resources; for example, by maintaining forested areas as hunting preserves 
(Gadgil & Guha, 1992). The Mauryan Empire continued the Vedic Aryans’ push for 
increased land control from which to establish further agriculture, in a much more 
organized and intense manner (Gadgil & Guha, 1992). It is from this time period that 
“the first convincing proof of a dam and an irrigation system in India has been dated” 
(CSE, 1997:21). In conjunction with dams and irrigation works, a new management 
structure emerged, with a class of officers who governed the irrigation system. Dams and 
irrigation works were constructed by villagers, with state support, and managed by the 
local inhabitants (CSE, 1997). This, perhaps, is the earliest record of communal property 
management of water in India, albeit under the purview of state ownership. Irrigation 
technologies allowed the Mauryans to increase agriculture productivity in colonized 
areas, resulting in ever-larger surpluses that could then be repatriated to the Empire 
providing an increased resource base from which to finance further expansion (Morrison,
2005).
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The increased control by the Mauryan state broke down conservation as practiced 
by hunter-gatherers, and caused an erosion of the resource base. The acknowledgment of 
a degrading environmental situation and the need for increased conservation, led to the 
re-emergence of Buddhism, and the abandonment of the Yajna (Gadgil & Guha, 1992). 
Buddhism thrived in the Mauryan Empire following emperor Ashoka’s conversion to 
Buddhism in approximately 260 BCE (Morrison, 2005). State policy changed to promote 
conservation and the prudent use of resources, such as restraints on the killing of animals 
as well as the planting and protection of trees (Gadgil & Guha, 1992). Though they 
rejected the supernatural, Buddhism and Jainism built upon the social conventions 
established by food-gathering societies, advocating that resources should not be used 
wastefully (Gadgil & Guha, 1992). Evidence of the tradition of water harvesting for 
conservation appears in ancient “Buddhist and Jain texts [which] contain several 
references to canals, tanks, embankments and wells” (CSE, 1997:11).
2.3 Pre-Colonial Period
The Gupta Empire (320-600 CE) was to follow from the fourth to seventh 
centuries (Morrison, 2005). Due to unknown causes (but possibly due to a decline in 
rainfall, a depletion of soil fertility, and/or a decline in agricultural surplus due to 
population growth) in both the Gupta and post-Gupta periods, India suffered a severe 
resource crunch, which Gadgil and Guha (1992) argue led to a unique system of cultural 
adaptation to the natural environment. It was at this time that Buddhism and Jainism lost 
their influence in India and Hinduism re-emerged and came into its prime, bringing with 
it a renewed reverence of plants, animals and landscape. Though the Yama, or caste 
system, was already present in Indian society, the resource crunch provided the impetus
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for the crystallization of this form of social organization, which resulted in the allocation 
of control over particular resources to particular castes (Gadgil & Guha, 1992). The 
village became the main unit of social organization, with each caste possessing high 
levels of specialization in resource protection and regulation. New rules governing diet, 
common access, and hunting materialized, and the prudent use of natural resources 
appeared once again (Gadgil & Guha, 1992).
The resource crunch existed in India from approximately the fourth to tenth 
centuries, and improvement to this situation was in part brought about by “the 
introduction of new technologies, such as irrigation tanks, which would lead to a rise in 
agricultural productivity and production” (Gadgil & Guha, 1992:106). In the post-Gupta 
period, the management and spread of the new technologies, for example tank irrigation 
systems with sluice gates, became centred on the temple, and were controlled by the 
Brahman caste (Joshi, 1997).
During the medieval period, especially under the rule of the Hindu Vijayanagar 
kings of the south (1336-1614 CE), the water harvesting tradition in India became well 
developed (CSE, 2001:5). The tax regime played an important part of this development. 
Taxes were collected as a percentage (approximately twenty percent) of total produce 
generated by a farm (CSE, 2001).11 Thus, kings’ revenue fluctuated with the success of 
local agriculture. In drought years, when total produce generated was significantly lower, 
so too were the kings’ revenues. As agricultural prosperity was vital for increasing state 
revenue, agricultural production was intensified, and kings encouraged the building of 
water harvesting structures by offering fiscal incentives. Grants of tax-free lands were
11 It should be noted that there were a variety o f governance structures surrounding water, based on the 
leadership o f  the particular area. One such system was goam where the local people helped maintain the 
water infrastructure through voluntary labour (Suzuki & Dressel, 2002).
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provided in return for the construction and maintenance of irrigation structures. Thus, the 
king had a vested interest in ensuring the success of local agriculture, and a large part of 
this was ensuring proper management of water resources (CSE, 2001).
Local communities were vested with the responsibility of water resource 
management (and in some cases ownership), with
powers to arrange for construction, repairs and maintenance of tanks; powers 
regarding land transactions relating to irrigation; management of water 
supply; levy and collection of cess for irrigation and powers to assign cess; 
powers to engage and remunerate local functionaries; maintenance of records; 
dispute settlement; and, relations with the central government. (CSE, 
1997:298)
Villages would allocate approximately five percent of their produce for maintenance of 
tanks and irrigation structures (CSE, 2001). Thus, there was strong interest at both the 
local and supralocal levels for proper water resource management (CSE, 1997).
During the Muslim Period (1500-1700 CE), political power shifted north to the 
Mughal Empire (Metcalf & Metcalf, 2002). The Mughal Empire maintained a similar tax 
regime to that of the southern Vijayanagar Empire. The control and management of 
resources, including water, remained under the purview of villages (Gadgil & Guha, 
1992). Conservationism continued with some practices being advanced as religious 
edicts. The first European settlers arrived in 1498 (Morrison, 2005). By the mid­
eighteenth century, the Mughal Empire’s power had contracted being usurped by regional 
powers that were previously subordinate. “Among the new regional powers was a joint
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stock company of English traders, which, by century’s end, was poised to claim the 
mantle of the Mughals as ruler of the subcontinent” (Metcalf & Metcalf, 2002:28).
By the end of the Mughal Empire, India had developed a myriad of advanced 
technologies to harvest, concentrate, collect, divert, and store water, along with the 
necessary institutions to manage these systems. While it is not possible to date the exact 
invention of many of the technologies used, it is important to outline their existence, as it 
is these technologies that can contribute to solving India’s current water issues.
In the hill and mountain regions of India, where streams and rivers were plentiful, 
Indians constructed simple structures, allowing the diversion of water for irrigation 
through artificial channels (guhls and kuhls) (CSE, 1997). In arid and semi-arid areas, 
water was diverted to storage structures (called zings in Ladakh, ahars in South Bihar, 
and keres in Kamatake) during times of seasonal plenty, to ensure adequate water during 
the ensuing dry seasons (CSE, 1997). Rooftop rainwater harvesting, kunds (artificial 
wells with surrounding catchments sloped toward the well to increase run-off), stepwells 
and subterranean tanks were employed in the Thar Desert region of Rajasthan (CSE, 
1997). In the floodplains of West Bengal, river embankments (zamindari banks) were 
built in such a way that would allow the rising river levels during the monsoon to be 
diverted to the fields, irrigating them, increasing soil fertility (through deposits of silt), 
controlling malaria (through fish that would eat mosquito larvae), and preventing 
flooding (CSE, 1997). In the coastal areas, such as the khazana lands of Goa, people 
developed sluice gates (shutter systems that open and close under tidal pressure) to 
regulate the changing salinity of surrounding freshwater in order to protect their rice 
fields (CSE, 1997). Horizontal wells (surangams), similar to the qanats of the Middle
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East, were used in the mountainous region of the Eastern Ghats to turn hillside seepage 
into drinking water (CSE, 1997). The people of the northeastern hill ranges built intricate 
networks of bamboo pipelines to carry water from natural springs over difficult terrain to 
a convenient point where it could be used for drinking. In many areas, rain was 
considered the main source of water, most of which fell in a mere 100 hours each year 
during the monsoon season. People constructed many systems to capture the rain in 
order to meet their water demands for the rest of the year. One such catchment system 
was to build earthen dams (khadins of the Jaisalmer district and johads of the Alwar 
district in Rajasthan), which would contain the water and allow it to slowly percolate into 
the soil, replenishing the underground aquifers (CSE, 1997). “Thus, whether it was 
rainwater, streamwater, floodwater or groundwater, people developed ingenious ways to 
harvest and deliver that water for irrigation and for human and animal consumption” 
(CSE, 1997:28).
2.4 Colonial Period
From approximately 1750 to 1858, Britain increased its control over the Indian 
subcontinent through the British East India Company (EIC). While the EIC did not 
initially start out with the objective to conquer India, it did possess an insatiable desire for 
increased trade (Metcalf & Metcalf, 2002). In India, the EIC found “a land of abundant 
riches...[with]...surpluses generated at the village level,” in large part due to the 
successful harvesting of water, developed from thousands of years of tradition in 
improving water management (CSE, 2001:5). In contrast, the British homeland was 
experiencing the Industrial Revolution, which had drastically transformed their natural 
resource usage. For example, the British had come to believe “that private property in
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land alone ensured stability and progress in society” (Metcalf & Metcalf, 2002:77); this 
belief took legislative shape in the zamindari land system, whereby the land owner 
(zamindar) had principal rights and responsibility of their estates, while peasants were 
relegated to tenant status with no rights. Prior to this system, property rights were shared 
amongst land ‘owners,’ peasant cultivators, and government, with the tax burden being 
shared by the former two entities. This tax was a proportion of the total produce 
generated on the land. Under the zamindari land system, the tax burden fell with the 
landowners only, whose land could be expropriated if they failed to pay the taxes 
assessed on the land. Taxes became fixed and payment became permitted only in cash 
(Tewari, 2005). The initial tax rates imposed by the British were excessively high, and 
one-third of all estates in Bengal state changed hands in the first twenty years of the 
zamindari land system. Even worse, the necessity to pay an inflexible tax in cash, 
resulted in zamindars switching their cultivation to cash crops, and/or selling high 
percentages of their food crops (Metcalf & Metcalf, 2002). With such a high tax burden, 
there was little production left to earmark for village maintenance of the traditional water 
management systems. Consequently India’s water infrastructure came into disrepair, 
agriculture production suffered, and incomes declined, all of which resulted in famines 
becoming increasingly the norm (CSE, 1997).
The EIC’s quest to secure increased trade, with the establishment of clearly 
delineated trading rights within India, was understandably met with conflict from those 
within Indian society who traditionally had rights over particular resources and 
commodities. The mercantilist success of the EIC relative to India’s family merchants, 
combined with British allowances for the EIC to arm its ships against interlopers, created
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an entity with both economic and militaristic power. “With a larger revenue base, the 
Company could field a larger army than its Indian rivals, and organize a more efficient 
state structure” (Metcalf & Metcalf, 2002:54). During this period, millions of pounds 
sterling were transferred from India to English banks, with minimal benefit to Indian 
producers (CSE, 1997).
“The East India Company ruled India till 1857, the year of what the British call 
the Great Mutiny, and the Indians call the First War of Independence” (CSE, 1997:274). 
In 1858, the EIC’s control over India was replaced by direct rule under the British 
Crown. Patterns of resource use that were predominant in industrial Britain began to 
emerge and change the traditional patterns of resource use in India. Three key aspects of 
this change were: “the elevation of commercial over subsistence uses [of natural 
resources], the delegitimization of the community, and the abandoning of restraints on 
resource exploitation” (Gadgil & Guha, 1992:116).
The introduction of the zamindari land system caused the deterioration of 
irrigation tanks, destroying the village-based water management systems and weakening 
traditional village authority. “The breakdown of traditional small-scale community 
irrigation systems was believed to be a factor in rural impoverishment” (Gagil & Guha, 
1992:145). The British “took over the role of the main provider of water and replaced 
traditional decentralized systems with centralized ones,” favouring large-scale works over 
small-scale works (CSE, 2001:1). However, government functionaries did a poor job of 
maintaining and operating the water system (CSE, 1997). Under British state-central 
rule, the disruption of the village social structure, and the removal of their governing
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power, led to a loss of local control over natural resources and a decline in traditional 
management and conservation measures;
Of utmost importance to the ecological cycle was the British takeover of forest 
management, which would have a devastating impact on India’s water management.
The revenue orientation of colonial land policy also worked towards the 
denudation of forests. As their removal added to the class of land assessed 
for revenue, forests were considered an obstruction to agriculture and 
consequently a bar to the prosperity of the Empire. (Gagil & Guha, 1992:120)
This process of deforestation greatly intensified with the building of the railway network, 
which was fostered by the Indian Forest Act of 1865. The British attached more 
importance to the development of railways than irrigation, “convinced that the railway 
would be the key to the spread of British power and civilization” (Metcalf & Metcalf, 
2002:95). The reasoning behind this was three-fold: 1) to extend the market within India 
for British manufactured goods, 2) to extend Britain’s ability to procure Indian raw 
materials for British manufacturers, and 3) to allow Britain’s military to quickly 
concentrate troops wherever they were needed (Metcalf & Metcalf, 2002). As forests 
disappeared, the system that previously trapped the monsoon rains in the soil disappeared 
also. Deforestation left large swaths of desert where monsoon rains would merely run off 
to the ocean, instead of recharging the ground aquifers (Suzuki & Dressel, 2002). The 
analogy can be made of the water table as a bank account; constant withdrawals without 
any deposits will lead to bankruptcy (Narain, 2003). In this manner, aquifer recharge acts 
as a deposit to replenish the account, which is of utmost importance for long-term 
sustainability of water supply. “However, perhaps the most serious consequence of
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colonial forestry was the decline in traditional conservation and management systems 
around the forest” as the tendency was to “break up village communities” (Gagil & Guha, 
1992:143).
2.5 Post-Colonial India
Prior to Independence, a debate ensued between Indian nationalists regarding the 
future planning process of India’s development path once the British had left. On one 
side of the debate were those who advocated the Gandhian approach, and on the other 
side were the proponents of the ‘modernizing’ Nehru-Mahalanobis approach. The 
Gandhians argued that a better balance between man and nature in their approach to 
development, with the limitation of wants, and small-scale initiatives (i.e. hand spinning) 
carried out by self-reproducing village communities, was fundamental to recovering 
India’s lost autonomy, and reviving the economies of the rural villages, where the 
majority of India’s population lived.
Gandhi’s scheme was to begin with the villages, to stabilize and enrich their 
traditional way of life by use of labor-intensive manufacture and handicrafts, 
and to keep the nation’s economic decision making as decentralized as 
possible, even if this slowed the pace of urban and industrial growth to a 
crawl. (Schumacher, 1973:5) •
In short, the Gandhian approach argued for a revival of the development practices that 
India had not experienced since the Mughal period (Gadgil & Guha, 1992). Presumably 
then, this approach would have also advocated a revitalization of India’s traditional water 
management systems.
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In contrast, the Nehruvian supporters argued that it was precisely India’s failure to 
adopt modernization, and its intellectual and economic backwardness, that permitted its 
subjugation by the British colonizers. Thus, they accepted a ‘commodity-centered’ 
approach and desired a quick transition to industrialization, urbanization, and utilization 
of a state-controlled strategy of development that would allow India to ‘catch up’ to the 
West (Gagil & Guha, 1992). The Nehru-Mahalanobis approach effortlessly won popular 
support and, as India gained Independence in 1947, it was this specific strategy of 
planning that took hold (Chakravarty, 1987). Influenced by Keynes’ advocacy of state 
interventionism, Nehru pursued the vision of a mixed economy within a socialist 
framework of economic policy, and focused on building a strong state with the role of the 
redistribution of some assets (i.e. land), a regulatory role (i.e. licenses), and large public 
sector role of ownership (i.e. water). The notion of water as a public good emerged, and 
centralized state-control of this sector continued (CSE, 2001).
India’s current water situation can in part be blamed on colonial rule, since the 
British had done much to destroy India’s traditional water management systems. 
However, “no agency can be blamed more for this than the wretched Indian state” itself 
(CSE, 1997:29). It was the rising Indian capitalist class, a generation educated by the 
British, who formed the post-Independence Indian political leadership (CSE, 1997). 
Underlying these elites’ “strategy of imitative industrialization was the adoption of the 
most ‘modem’ technologies, with little regard for their social or ecological 
consequences” (Gadgil & Guha, 1992:184). These new Indian bureaucrats held nothing 
but disdain for the traditional water technologies, and their decentralized management 
methods. Consequently, “no effort was made to revive these systems or build new
41
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
systems in a way that complemented the traditional systems” (CSE, 1997:29). Instead, 
the Indian state opted for “modem science and technology, the messiah of high 
productivity” and the ensuing creation of large-scale water projects, such as mega-dams, 
and ever-deepening wells for groundwater extraction (CSE, 1997:311). Though well- 
meaning, NGOs (predominantly from the 1960s to 1980s) contributed to the heavy and 
unsustainable dependence on groundwater resources through the extensive provision of 
wells for drinking, animal needs, and irrigation (Suzuki & Dressel, 2002). As these wells 
allowed the underground aquifers to be depleted faster than they could be recharged, only 
a short period of time passed before wells had to be dug ever-deeper in order to reach 
water, and previous alternative sources of water, such as harvesting rainwater, were 
forgotten.
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) began in India in 1991, and with SAPs 
came such policy prescriptions as deregulation and privatization (Dreze & Sen, 2002). 
Regarding the environment, and more specifically water resources, deregulation can 
easily lead to increased pollution of water bodies from which the poor collect their 
drinking water supplies, and the privatization of water leaves the poorest people unable to 
pay for drinking water (Ellwood, 2001). Furthermore, since 1991, India has seen a 
declining share of public expenditure on education, health and related sectors (i.e. water 
supply and sanitation infrastructure and maintenance) (Motiram, 2005). The case study 
of Coca-Cola in India is but one example of the impact SAPs have had on Indian water 
resources. Coca-Cola’s practices in Kerala have continuously overdrawn common water 
supplies, while at the same time discharging toxic waste into the surrounding area that
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has polluted the groundwater table. What remains for local Indians is a shortage of 
drinking water, which is polluted (Rajeev, 2005).
In 2002, the Indian Supreme Court issued a directive to the national Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) government suggesting that they undertake a grandiose project -  the 
‘garland of rivers’ proposal. This proposal, advocating the linking of thirty-seven of 
India’s river systems (whereby water from these systems would be diverted throughout 
India and captured behind thirty-two major dams), exemplifies the modern-day solution 
to solving the country’s water shortage crisis (Black, 2004). While the ‘garland of rivers 
proposal’ has not yet been fully executed, it shows that the dominant ideology regarding 
water management in India has not changed.
Pant (2003) succinctly summarizes the post-colonial impact of India’s 
development policy on its traditional water management systems, as well as the current 
water situation in India:
Today, unfortunately, this entire heritage, cultural and technological, lives in 
tatters. And no agency can be blamed more for this than we ourselves. As 
modem technology came in, people became dependent on piped water supply 
and in the bargain forgot the use of the old time-tested water harvesting 
techniques. Over the years, therefore, not only have we not developed our 
traditional wisdom further through the application of modem science and 
technology, we have permitted our knowledge and systems to atrophy in 
favour of exploitative and unsustainable methods. The net result is growing 
water distress in increasingly large parts of the country. (Pant, 2003:62)
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Thus, instead of reversing the trends of the colonial period, the post-colonial period was 
marked by further downward trends with respect to water management.
2.6 Changing Currents: Reasons for Hope
India has a rich history of common property resource management, though 
colonization and globalization have diminished its predominance. Despite years of 
‘modernization’ there are still pockets in India where the traditional water management 
systems are in place and in use. These areas tend to be rural and remote, particularly in 
the Himalayan states, where the “reach of water bureaucracies remains weak” (Agarwal 
& Narain, 1997:112). Though these pockets are few, there is an emerging campaign to 
revive traditional water management systems in India, particularly in Rajasthan. 
Additionally, in some parts of the country (i.e. in the city of Mumbai and in the state of 
Tamil Nadu), governments have legislated that “it is now mandatory for all [new] 
buildings to have rainwater harvesting devices” (Black, 2004:133). With the removal of 
the BJP government, perhaps there is a glimmer of hope that the new administration will 
adopt less socially and ecologically destructive water management policies. In looking to 
the past, it is possible to find solutions to the current water crisis in India. Part of this 
retrospective analysis must include an examination of the pockets in India where 
traditional water management systems still exist, a determination of what makes these 
systems work in their particular locale, and an analysis of whether aspects of these 
systems are applicable to the current problem in other areas of India or in other 
developing countries. The following chapters will investigate one such pocket -  Ladakh.
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3. CASE STUDY OF LADAKH 
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Figure 1: Location of Ladakh within India and South Asia.
Note: The borders on this map are not officially recognized. (Map by Natalie Boyd)
Ladakh is a semi-autonomous region, in the eastern half of Jammu and Kashmir 
state, in the far north of India (see Figure 1). Ladakh “shares its much disputed north­
western border with Pakistan, while to the north lies the Chinese province of Sinkiang,
i oand to the east, Chinese-occupied Tibet” (Loram, 2004:103). Due to its location, 
Ladakh has become one of India’s most important strategic zones, and a heavy military
12 If the disputed region between India and Pakistan was settled in India’s favour, then Ladakh would also 
share a short border with Afghanistan.
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presence exists throughout the region (Goodall, 2004). Geographically situated on the 
western extension of the Tibetan Plateau, Ladakh lies nestled between the world’s two 
highest mountain ranges -  the Himalaya, to the south, and the Karakoram, to the north. 
Between these two vast ranges are the Ladakh and Zanskar mountains, located north and 
south of the Indus Valley respectively. The name Ladakh is derived from the Tibetan la- 
dags, meaning “land of high mountain passes,” and, as its namesake suggests, Ladakh 
lies at altitudes ranging from about 2,750 to 7,670 metres above sea level (Harvey, 
1983:14; Government of Jammu & Kashmir [GoJ&K], 2006c).
This high-altitude trans-Himalayan region is classified as a cold desert, due to its 
aridity and cold temperatures. Lying in the rain shadow of the Great Himalayan Range, 
Ladakh, characterized by its barren, lunar-like landscape, rarely receives precipitation in 
the form of rain. The Himalayas form an almost impenetrable barrier to the monsoon 
clouds of the Indian south, and as a result, mean annual precipitation is less than 150 
millimetres, with a typical year exhibiting over 300 days of clear, sunny skies (Wiley, 
1997). For comparison, the hot Thar Desert, of the more southern Indian state of 
Rajasthan, receives a similar meagre 100 millimetres of precipitation in the west, and 
about 500 millimetres in the east (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2007b; Rawat & 
Wikramanayake, 2001). In both cases, most of this rain falls during a short period from 
July to September, and recently, both Ladakh and Rajasthan have been experiencing 
significant increases in their annual average precipitation (Loram, 2004; Tyagi & Yadav,
2006). However, despite Ladakh’s aridity, its landscape was not always so parched. In 
fact, “Ladakh was once covered by an extensive lake system, the vestiges of which still
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exist on its south-east plateaux” in a number of high-altitude fresh and salt water13 lakes 
(GoJ&K, 2006a). Mineral and sulphur springs also speckle the dry landscape.
The majority of precipitation in Ladakh therefore falls in the form of snow. In 
central Ladakh, snowfall can be rather negligible in winter, however “in Zanskar and the 
far west of Ladakh, especially around Drass, substantial falls are common” (Loram, 
2004:105). The region of Ladakh normally remains land-locked from November to June 
as the Leh-Srinagar and Leh-Manali highways, the two highways which connect Ladakh 
with the rest of the country, are kept closed because of the snowfall and extremes of 
winter weather (namely avalanches, ice, wind, and poor visibility on the narrow winding 
passes). The only route accessible to Ladakh during the winter is air, though the air 
services are infrequent and there are often cancellations of flights due to fog in Delhi and 
Leh (National Informatics Centre [NIC], 2006a).
Temperatures in Ladakh range from highs of 30 degrees Celsius in the peak of 
summer (July-August) to lows of -30 degrees Celsius14 in the peak of winter (December- 
February), though summer days are usually quite mild averaging about 20 degrees 
Celsius, and winters are long and cold, with the average daily temperature hovering 
around -20 degrees Celsius (Jacobson, 2000; Loram, 2004; Wiley, 1997). “Given the 
mountainous conditions of Ladakh, there are many microclimates that are characterized 
by different temperatures, precipitation, and solar radiation, but in general, Ladakh is 
arid, dusty, windy, and cold for much of the year, and the air always hypoxic” (Wiley, 
1997:276). Notably, Ladakh is considered one of the coldest, highest and driest inhabited
13 Since ancient times, salt has been extracted from these lakes and traded for human consumption 
throughout Ladakh (Loram, 2004).
14 In the Drass area (o f Kargil District), the second coldest place in the world after Siberia, the temperatures 
can drop to as low as -50 degrees Celsius in winter (Government o f  Jammu & Kashmir, 2006b).
47
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
places on earth, and though the environment appears harsh and inhospitable, people have 
not only survived here, but have thrived here for centuries (Page, 1993).
Due to Ladakh’s aridity and cold temperatures, the agricultural season is limited; 
generally, ploughing begins in April and the harvest is completed by September, 
however, depending on the elevation, climate, and water availability of a given village, 
the season could be as short as four months (GoJ&K, 2006c). Adding to these 
challenges, the fragile mountain soil, which is thin, sandy, and porous, is subject to 
erosion due to persistent winds and heavy snowfall throughout the year (NIC, 2006a). 
Soil erosion further contributes to the already ecologically marginal conditions for 
farming in Ladakh (Kala & Mathur, 2002). Yet, despite these conditions, narrow fertile 
valleys, scattered here and there, provide a stark contrast to the otherwise austere 
landscape. These lush patches of green that dot the dry landscape are villages of 
cultivated fields, which have been carved out of the rocks and sand of the desert and 
irrigated utilizing the ingenuity of an age-old system of diverting the meltwater, from 
higher altitudes, into an intricate system of channels (yuras). These channels, which were 
built centuries ago, bring this water to their fields, often over great distances and rough 
terrain. Several major river systems flow through Ladakh, including the Indus, Zanskar, 
Shyok, Nubra, Suru, and Drass Rivers. “Most villages and fields are situated on the 
relatively flat plains of the [these river valleys] or in subsidiary valleys along tributary 
streams” (Wiley, 1997:277). Thus, the location and size of each village depends on the 
topography, but more-so on the availability of water (Jacobson, 2000). Due to the scant 
rainfall in Ladakh, farmers have to primarily rely on glacial meltwater, snowmelt, springs 
(chumiks), and marsh (spang) water to irrigate their crops.
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The principal crop is barley, and its roasted flour comprises the staple of the 
Ladakhi diet. Secondary crops include fast-growing varieties of wheat, peas, and 
mustard, and most households maintain a sizable vegetable garden of turnips, potatoes, 
onions, beans, cauliflower, carrots, cabbage and various greens. Within some villages, at 
elevations below 3,500 metres, there are orchards of apricots, apples, and walnut trees. 
In the subalpine zones, poplar and willow trees grow wherever there is water and, in the 
higher alpine zones, juniper trees, wild roses, and sea buckthorn bushes can be found 
amidst sparse, but hardy, low-lying shrubs (Loram, 2004). “Cultivation is possible only 
up to 4,000 metres, above which nomadic or seasonally nomadic populations live with 
their livestock” and instead depend largely on herding and animal husbandry for their 
livelihoods (Wiley, 1997:277).
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Figure 2: Location of Ladakh within the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir.
Note: The borders on this map are not officially recognized. (Map by Natalie Boyd)
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Ladakh is the largest and highest, yet least densely populated region in India 
(Wiley, 1997). Occupying almost two-thirds of the state of Jammu and Kashmir15, 
Ladakh accounts for a little less than three percent of its population16 (see Figure 2) 
(Sikand, 2006). Once an independent Buddhist kingdom, established in about 950 CE 
and with ruling dynasties that descended from the kings of old Tibet, Ladakh came under 
Dogra rule as a result of the Dogra invasion of 1834-1842 (Rizvi, 1983). In 1846, 
Ladakh was incorporated into the state of Jammu and Kashmir as a single district 
(Loram, 2004). “Even though the British had consolidated their rule in large parts of the 
country, the Kashmir territories were sold to the Dogras, although control was retained 
over economic affairs due to the lucrative trans-Himalayan trade” (Tiwari & Gupta, 
2003:1). Partition in 1947 left Ladakh as part of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, 
however, in July 1979, the district of Kargil bifurcated from the rest of the region, and 
Ladakh was divided (GoJ&K, 2006b). Ladakh now consists of two districts: the larger 
Leh District, in the northern and eastern parts of the region, and Kargil District, in the 
western and southern reaches of the region (Goodall, 2004). This study will be confined 
to the region of Ladakh within Leh District.
The creation of two districts reflects the religious divide within the region, and as 
a result, Leh District is predominantly comprised of Tibetan Buddhists, while Kargil 
District predominantly Shi’a Muslims (Sikand, 2006). As per the 2001 Census of India, 
Leh District has a population of 117,232 while the population of Kargil District is 
119,307 (Government of India, 2001b). Though both districts have a roughly equal
15 The whole o f  Ladakh covers a geographical area o f about 96,700 square kilometres, including the 37,555 
square kilometres that have been under Chinese occupation since 1962 (GoJ&K, 2006c).
16 According to Census o f  India 2001 statistics, the total population o f state o f  Jammu and Kashmir is 
10,069,917 (Government o f India, 200 la).
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population, the population growth rate in Kargil District is considerably higher than in 
Leh District, and although, on the whole, Ladakh is still predominantly Buddhist, it might 
not be for very much longer (Sikand, 2006). Besides religion, these two districts stand in 
contrast with each other in terms of, inter alia, language, geography and climate17. Both 
districts are each further divided into blocks. Leh District is divided into six blocks -  
Leh, Kharu, Khaltse, Nubra, Durbuk, and Nyoma -  and Kargil District into seven blocks 
-  Kargil, Drass, Shakar-Chiktan, Sankoo, Zanskar, Taisuru, and Shargole (NIC, 2006b). 
The vast majority of the population of Ladakh still live as farmers in small, rural villages, 
though urbanization has, in the past few decades, become an ever-more pervasive trend 
(Goodall, 2004; Page, 1993; Wiley, 1997).
The Ladakhis are the result of a long blending of different ethnic groups, most 
importantly the Dards and the Tibetans (Monasterio, 2000). Originating from Gilgit in 
Pakistan, the Dards were Indo-Aryans and were the first people to settle in the region 
which is now known as Ladakh (NIC, 2006c). One group of Dards, known as the Mons, 
maintain their Buddhist heritage, yet are distinguished by their non-Tibetan features, and 
are thought to be the descendants of the original Dard settlers (Harvey, 1983). Another 
group of Dards, in the Drass area of Kargil District, at some point embraced Islam, and so 
lost their original cultural identity (Rizvi, 1983). And a third group of Dards, known as 
Brokpa and who live in the western Dha-Hanu area of Khaltse Block in Leh District, 
have retained much of their original culture and are the only Dards to have preserved 
their unique form of Buddhism, which is mixed with the pre-Buddhist animistic religion, 
Bon (Loram, 2004). This small community of about a couple thousand of Dards has
17 In Kargil District, the predominant language is Kargali. Average elevations tend to be a little lower, thus 
the district experiences warmer temperatures in summer, and heavier snowfall in winter (NIC, 2006b).
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resisted the ethnic blending that the majority of Ladakhis have experienced and instead 
appear to have preserved their Indo-Aryan purity down the centuries (GoJ&K, 2006c).
The Dard settlers were joined by Tibetan and Mongolian pastoral nomadic 
herders perhaps a millennium or so ago, but large-scale immigration from Tibet did not 
occur until around the eighth to tenth centuries, overwhelming Dard culture and largely 
obliterating their racial characteristics (GoJ&K, 2006c). Whereas, further to the west, 
present-day Ladakhi people’s appearances suggest a more mixed origin, in central and 
eastern Ladakh, the great majority of people bear the physical features of their Tibetan 
origins, until, in the far eastern reaches of the Changthang area of Ladakh, an almost pure 
Tibetan population is found (Rizvi, 1983).
Not only do the majority of Ladakhis reflect their Tibetan heritage in their 
appearances, Ladakhi culture -  art, architecture, dress, music, medicine, language, 
religion -  does so as well (Norberg-Hodge, 1992). The dominant language in Ladakh is 
Ladakhi, which was derived from Tibetan and belongs to the Sino-Tibetan language 
phylum (Wiley, 1997). Tibetan Buddhism predominates in the region, with the Dalai 
Lama as the spiritual leader. In fact, “Ladakh was the conduit through which Buddhism 
reached Tibet from India and in the process it got deeply entrenched in the region from 
the very beginning” (GoJ&K, 2006a).
An intrinsic part of Ladakhi culture is the notion of mutual aid. “In traditional 
Ladakhi society, people have special links not only with their own family and immediate 
neighbors, but with households scattered throughout the entire region as well” (Norberg- 
Hodge, 1992:52). Thus, the individual is part of a web of supportive relationships and as 
a result, cooperation, rather than competition, shapes Ladakhi society. Cooperation is
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formalized in a number of social institutions. In one such institution, the pashpun, each 
family belongs to a group of households, sometimes from different villages, which help 
each other at the time of birth, marriage, and death (Page, 1993). Another institution, the 
system of rares, is the communal shepherding of animals, and bes, refers to shared labour 
where, for example, “some farmers will stagger the harvest, even when two fields are ripe 
at the same time, just so they can work together” (Norberg-Hodge, 1992:53). The 
practice of lhangsde, an extensive system of sharing resources, such as farm tools and 
draft animals, evolved to enable the labour-intensive activities, for example sowing and 
harvesting, to be completed as quickly as possible (Loram, 2004). The spirit of mutual 
support is especially evident in the distribution of water. Villages are divided up into 
chutsos, or groups of houses, and, over the centuries, a system of sharing has been 
developed which determines when each household can divert water from the main 
channel to its fields (Page, 1993). Also, other activities, such as the rebuilding of 
irrigation channels, involve the community as a whole, which is further evidence of the 
pervasive societal nature of cooperation.
For centuries, Ladakh's culture was preserved by its geographic isolation. Remote 
though it was, Ladakh was never totally isolated. Over the ages, the Silk Route from 
India to Central Asia passed through Ladakh, however the virtually insurmountable 
mountain ranges of the Himalaya and Karakoram protected Ladakh from the influences 
of the rest of the outside world. Colonialism never reached this far so the indigenous 
culture remained relatively intact (Schenk, 2003). Besides documenting the region via 
census records, economic statistics, area maps, and land surveys, the British generally left 
Ladakh untouched and it remained under Dogra rule until Partition in 1947 (Tiwari &
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Gupta, 2003). Therefore, unlike the rest of India, the traditional water management 
system in Ladakh was not affected by colonialism. “This relative isolation of Ladakh 
was broken and altered at the time of Independence in 1947, bringing it within the 
purview of the Indian Nation State in the state of Jammu & Kashmir” (Tiwari & Gupta, 
2003:2). Then, the first major change regarding external influence came as late as 1960, 
when the Indian government built a road from the Kashmir valley into Ladakh to defend 
its borders with China and Pakistan (Hales, 1986). Thousands of Indian troops began to 
move into the region, and the roads facilitated a new increased movement of goods in and 
out of Ladakh. And then in 1974, foreigners were permitted to begin visiting Ladakh, 
and the area was thrown open to tourism and development (Loram, 2004).
3.2 Leh District
This research was confined to the region of Ladakh within the district of Leh. 
Leh District comprises the heartland of Ladakh, located on the relatively flat plains of the 
Indus River Valley (see Figure 3). The mighty Indus River, one of the world’s longest 
rivers, and from where India’s name is derived, enters Ladakh in the east, from its origin 
near the holy Mt. Kailash in Tibet, and flows northward to the western side of Ladakh 
into northern Pakistan, where it then turns to flow south to the Arabian Sea near Karachi 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2007a). In central Ladakh, the Indus forms a broad valley, 
about 10 kilometres wide, between the Ladakh and Stok Mountain Ranges. Most villages 
and fields are situated along this valley, on both the north and south banks of the river, or 
in subsidiary valleys along tributary streams (Wiley, 1997). The two highways 
connecting Ladakh to the rest of India, the Leh-Srinagar and the Leh-Manali highways, 
also parallel the Indus River for much of its length through the district (from Khaltse in
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the northwest to Upshi in the southeast). Leh District is divided into six blocks - Leh, 
Kharu, Khaltse, Nubra, Durbuk, and Nyoma. This research was restricted to the Leh, 
Kharu, and Khaltse Blocks.
BLOCK KHALTSE
BLOCK
Figure 3: Map of Leh District.
Note: Map by Aaron Dana. Reprinted with permission.
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3.2.1 Leh Block
In Leh Block, the town of Leh, and the villages of Saboo and Matho, were 
investigated (see Figure 4).
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(t a r o o ,
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Figure 4: Map of Leh Block.
Note: Map by Aaron Dana. Reprinted with permission.
Leh
Leh, the capital of Ladakh, lies on the north side of the Indus River Valley, 
nestled between the Stok Mountains to the south and the Ladakh Range to the north. “In 
the 15th century both Leh and the village of Shey shared the responsibility of being the 
capitals of Upper Ladakh. Shey was the more fortified of the two, while Leh [situated at
1 o
the foot of the Khardung La ] was in a prime position for trade” (Loram, 2004:117).
18 Directly north o f  Leh is a stretch o f road, claimed to be one o f the highest motorable roads in the world, 
which passes over the Khardung La, a high mountain pass at 5602 metres altitude in the Ladakh Range, and 
descends on the other side into the Nubra Valley (Loram, 2004).
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The Shey monastery remained the royal residence until the ‘lion’ King Sengge Namgyal 
built the Leh Palace and shifted his court to Leh in the 17th century, to be closer to the 
Khardung La, the gateway of the renowned Silk Route (Loram, 2004). It was due to this 
move that Leh became the regional capital and the kingdom of Ladakh attained its 
greatest geographical extent and glory. It did not take long before Leh blossomed into 
one of the busiest markets on this ancient route, as caravans carrying raw silk, spices, 
textiles, carpets, salt, tea, semi-precious stones and narcotics made Leh their midway stop 
along this long trade route between the Punjab and Central Asia (GoJ&K, 2006a). For 
centuries, this trade route was traversed by caravan traders from Turkistan, Afghanistan, 
Tibet, the Punjab, Kashmir, and Baltistan, and consequently, Leh developed into a 
bustling hub of merchants, as well as an important and prosperous centre of trade (Loram, 
2004)). Leh’s significance as a trading centre, however, was considerably diminished 
with the closing of the borders into Tibet and Central Asia by the Chinese authorities in 
1959, yet Leh has remained the administrative and commercial capital of Ladakh to 
present day (Loram, 2004).
Situated at 3,500 metres altitude above sea level, the town of Leh, according to 
the 2001 census, hosts a population of 28,639 people, inhabiting 6,580 households 
(District Statistics and Evaluation Agency [DSEA], 2006:32). Formerly a central core of 
Old Leh town with surrounding villages, over the centuries of growth, these villages 
became absorbed into the core and are now more like neighbourhoods of the town proper. 
These neighbourhoods roughly correspond with the groupings of households called 
chutsos. Each chutso is determined geographically and serves to facilitate the 
distribution and management of water within a specific area of Leh. The 6,580
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households in Leh are divided into nine such groupings, named Gangles, Horzey, Gonpa, 
Changspa, Chubi Yangtse, Tukcha, Sheldan, Shenam, and Skara,
Leh has a southern aspect, and its main tokpo, or principal stream, originates at 
Khardung La and is fed by the melting glaciers in the Ladakh Range, which lie to the 
north of the town. Barley and wheat are the two main crops that are grown in Leh. 
Water from the tokpo provides the primary source of water for irrigation for all of Leh, 
except Skara. Situated on the southern outskirts of Leh, Skara has no traditional or legal 
right to the tokpo coming down from the upper parts of town, and is therefore exclusively 
dependant on chumiks (springs) and spang (marshes) for drinking, domestic, and 
irrigation purposes.
The irrigation system of Leh town, spans a distance of over seven kilometres from 
Gangles, at the uppermost part of the town, to Shenam, which lies at the tail-end of the 
system. Water from the main tokpo first flows through Gangles Chutso, where it is 
diverted through yuras, or irrigation channels, to irrigate the fields in this area. Water 
from nearby chumiks is also collected in a zing, or man-made water storage reservoir, 
called Zing Gangles, which is used to supplement the water received through the yuras 
for irrigation. The water then flows on to do the same through the yuras of Horzey 
Chutso, and subsequently on to Gonpa Chutso, Around Gonpa, the main tokpo bifurcates 
into two tokpos -  Sheldan/Tukcha Tokpo (to the left) and Shenam Tokpo (to the right). 
Water emerging from the chumiks in the phu, or alpine pasture area, above Gonpa forms 
the Gymsta Tokpo, which supplies water for both irrigation and domestic purposes to 
Gonpa Chutso, and merges with the Sheldan/Tukcha Tokpo just above the War Zing. 
Sheldan/Tukcha Tokpo flows down from War Zing toward Pagale Zing, after which it
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further bifurcates into Sheldan Tokpo and Sangto/Tukcha Tokpo. Sheldan Tokpo flows 
through Sheldan Chutso and then down into the grazing lands lying below. 
Sangto/Tukcha Tokpo19 flows through Changspa Chutso, past Pharka Zing, Peyog Zing, 
and Sangto Zing, where it bifurcates once again to form the Tukcha Tokpo, which flows 
down through Tukcha Chutso, and the Sangto Tokpo, which carries water to Skara. 
Where the main tokpo bifurcates to the right near Gonpa, Shenam Tokpo flows down 
through Yangtse Chutso, toward Old Leh town near the palace ruins, past Karzoo Zing 
and Zing Chung, into Shenam Chutso and then down to the grazing lands below.
For over thirty years, the water from the tokpo has not been drinkable. In the 
upper reaches of the town, in Gangles and Horzey, people can still collect water directly 
from the tokpo for domestic purposes but down around the town centre, the water in the 
tokpos and yuras are much too polluted to be utilized. As a result, around the town 
centre, and elsewhere in Leh, the Public Health & Engineering (PHE) department of the 
Government of Jammu and Kashmir has installed several public stand posts for drinking 
water (see Figure 5). The state government department has also installed a piped-water 
system throughout Leh, from which the majority of people get their drinking water. This 
piped-water system, essentially a horizontal tube well, pumps potable water from an 
underground aquifer to tube wells, which then distributes the water to private connections 
at individual houses via (above-ground) steel pipes. This system, however, is inoperable 
for about six months of the year. At the end of October, the pipes are drained and closed, 
otherwise the water in the pipes would freeze in winter and burst the pipes. Therefore, 
from November until April, people get their drinking water delivered to their houses by
19 The Sangto/Tukcha Tokpo and its tributaries will from herein be referred to as simply Tukcha Tokpo.
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PHE water trucks (see Figure 6). The piped-water system does not reach some 
neighbourhoods; people living in these areas must rely on the PHE water trucks year- 
round. In some areas, like Changspa for example, people supplement these water sources 
by utilizing nearby chumiks for drinking and domestic purposes.
Figure 5: Public stand post. Figure 6: PHE water delivery truck.
The water management system in Leh begins with the selection and appointment 
of the churpuns, or water managers, which traditionally would be carried out by the goba, 
or headman. Though historically the position of the goba was inherited down a family 
line, now, the goba is an elected representative. The year this research was conducted, 
the goba was Sonam Zangpo of the Shenam Chutso. In earlier times, the goba would 
select a short list of up to fifteen eligible candidates for the position of churpun, who 
possessed qualities of leadership, responsibility, and influence. Then the lama (monk) at 
the Gangles Gompa (monastery) would draw lots and, after a puja (prayer ritual), seven 
of the potential candidates would be inaugurated as the churpuns for the coming 
agricultural season. Typically, two churpuns were chosen from Changspa Chutso, one 
from Chubi Yangtse, one from Shenam, one from Tukcha, and two from Sheldan.
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Beginning at the onset of the agricultural season in mid-April and ending with the 
harvest in mid-September, the churpun’s duties are to ensure that all fields receive water 
and that all minor repair and maintenance works are carried out. In earlier times, repair 
and maintenance of the entire system was completely carried out by the community. 
These days, all chutsos are responsible for the maintenance of yuras in their area, that is, 
to keep the yuras clean and repair broken yuras, however dependence on the government 
has grown such that now major repairs and maintenance, such as repairing zings, are 
undertaken by the local administration. It is the churpuns who determine when each 
household can divert water from the main tokpo to their fields, and if someone were to 
divert water to their fields without the churpun’s permission, it is the churpun’s 
responsibility to help resolve conflicts and to punish the perpetrator. Monetary and 
corporal punishment are the customary manners of punishment, and the severity of the 
violation determines the severity of the punishment. For example, in times of severe 
water shortage, or if large quantities of water have been illegally diverted, violators have 
been known to receive a hefty fine or beating.
Since 1965, though, the goba has not been involved in the selection or 
appointment of churpuns (Tiwari & Gupta, 2003). As the economy began to change from 
primarily a subsistence agrarian economy to primarily a monetary economy, people 
began to seek paid employment and regard the extra work and responsibility of the 
churpun as time-consuming and burdensome. One participant suggested that this was 
perhaps exacerbated by the pervasive army presence and population growth. As a result, 
the status of the churpun diminished and a new rotational system was created; the 
responsibility of the churpun for each chutso was rotated among the original households
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in Leh. However, as the population continued to grow, land became ever-more 
fragmented and the number of households increased substantially, and accordingly, so 
did the responsibilities of the churpuns. Where seven churpuns were earlier required to 
manage the irrigation system for all of Leh, now eleven are needed. The original 
households argued that the newly fragmented households also share in the responsibilities 
of becoming churpun, and since 1999-2000, each and every household in Leh, now has to 
take a turn at being churpun (Tiwari & Gupta, 2003).
In the past, the churpun would receive a load of unthreshed wheat from members 
of their chutso as compensation for their work, whereas now, churpuns receive monetary 
remuneration from the local administration. In some villages, a similar change from in- 
kind to cash compensation has also occurred, however it is only in Leh that the churpuns 
are paid by the government, and so are essentially now government employees. This 
change took place in Leh around 1984 as a direct result of the growing unwillingness 
among people to continue to carry out the role of the churpun (Tiwari & Gupta, 2003). 
Ever since that time, churpuns have received 3,000 INR (Indian Rupees) for the five 
months that they are employed. However, despite this monetary incentive, many people 
have jobs or businesses to run, and so are unable to devote the required amount of time to 
fulfill their churpun duties. Under these circumstances, when their turn comes to be 
churpun, they hire another family or a migrant labourer (typically from Nepal or the 
Bihar state of India) to undertake the responsibility of churpun in their place. The 
negotiated amount can often be much greater than the government salary of 3,000 INR, 
however bargaining power is dependant on water availability. If water is scarce, the role 
of the churpun is more difficult, and so a higher price can be demanded. The year this
201 CAD = 38 INR.
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research was conducted, churpuns in Leh worked for the first month or so of the 
agricultural season, and then due to the heavy rains, the water supply was abundant so 
their duties were discontinued. Nevertheless, they were still paid for the full five months.
“In 1971 there was an acute shortage of water in Leh21 and it was agreed upon by 
the people that the existing system of water distribution was not effective enough as the 
tail-end fields were not receiving sufficient water” (Tiwari & Gupta, 2003:10). In an 
attempt to ameliorate this problem, a new system of water distribution was created. In 
this new system, the upper three chutsos22 were included, and in addition to the tokpo- 
wise rotation, a temporal rotation was also introduced.
With the new temporal rotation, the day is divided into four time-periods, and 
during each period, water is diverted to a particular area of Leh. Between the hours of 
4:00 am and 10:00 am, water is diverted from the main tokpo into the yuras throughout 
Gangles, Horzey, and Gonpa. Beginning in Gangles, water is distributed from the top­
most yura to the bottom-most yura, working down one by one into each subsequent yura. 
When all the fields in Gangles have been irrigated, water is released into the yuras in 
Horzey in the same manner, and then finally into those in Gonpa. “If the allotted time 
runs out before all the fields in a certain area are irrigated, the next day irrigation begins 
from the field where it was left off the previous day” (Tiwari & Gupta, 2003:11).
Next, between the hours of 10:00 am and 4:00 pm, water is diverted tokpo-wise 
between Sheldan, Tukcha, and Shenam Tokpos, to irrigate the fields in Sheldan Chutso, 
Tukcha Chutso, and Shenam Chutso respectively. The system of water distribution
21 It was during this year that the elders o f  Leh last recall the skargya, or carved wooden seal, being used. 
For more detail on the use o f  the seal, see the Chemray section o f this chapter.
22 Ganles, Horzey, and Gonpa were not included in the old system as they apparently had access to 
sufficient water from their chumiks and the main tokpo. Therefore, in the old system, water was distributed 
on a rotational basis into the three tokpos that flowed through the lower chutsos in Leh.
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between these three tokpos occurs in that order, and is the same as it was in the old 
system. First, water is released into Sheldan Tokpo, and once all the fields in this area 
are irrigated then water is released into Tukcha Tokpo. After all the fields along Tukcha 
Tokpo are irrigated, finally water is diverted into Shenam Tokpo.
Around March, in preparation for the coming agricultural season, the fields in 
Shenam and Tukcha receive tha chu, or dry water. Tha chu moistens the barren soil in 
preparation for ploughing and sowing. Water stored in Karzoo Zing is used for Shenam’s 
tha chu, and water from Tukcha tokpo is used for Tukcha’s tha chu. Once the churpuns 
are appointed and War and Pagale Zings have been filled by the spring snowmelt, water 
is released into Sheldan Tokpo, signalling the beginning of the water rotation schedule 
for the current agricultural season. It takes about one month for all the fields along 
Sheldan Tokpo to be receive tha chu, but after all three chutsos have completed their tha 
chu, then the rotation becomes a regular 15-20 day cycle between the three tokpos 
(Tiwari & Gupta, 2003). When Sheldan finishes tha chu, the fields are ploughed and 
sown, and once small shoots begin to appear, then water is transferred to Tukcha Tokpo 
for dol chu, or the first irrigation after sowing. After all the fields in Tukcha Chutso have 
received dol chu, then water is shifted to Shenam Tokpo for Shenam’s fields to receive 
dol chu, and subsequently, it is diverted back to Sheldan again. This cycle repeats until 
the crops are ripe for harvest. During these cycles, the day water will go to Sheldan 
Tokpo, for example, for 15 days during which Tukcha will receive night water. The day 
water for the following 15 days will go to Tukcha and the night water to Shenam, and 
during the 15 days that Shenam receives day water, Sheldan will receive the night water. 
At the beginning of the agricultural season, the water is generally the most scarce, and so
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the irrigation system is strictly implemented, but once the glaciers begin to melt and the 
water in the main tokpo is more abundant, water is then released into all three tokpos 
simultaneously.
From 4:00 pm until 8:00 pm, the neighbourhoods included in the Chubi Yangste 
and Changspa Chutsos receive water. Between these hours, water from the main tokpo is 
diverted to yuras in these areas to irrigate their fields. Again, water is first distributed to 
the uppermost yuras and then shifted to the ones below, and so on, during the time-period 
allotted to these two chutsos.
The final time-period, between 8:00 pm and 4:00 am, water is diverted to the 
three major zings where it is stored over night and released the following morning to 
irrigate the fields below. Depending on the ongoing tokpo-wise rotation, if its Shenam 
Tokpo’s turn to receive water, then night water flowing down Shenam Tokpo is stored in 
Karzoo Zing and released the following morning to irrigate the fields throughout Shenam 
Chutso. Likewise, night water flowing down Sheldan and Tukcha Tokpos is stored in the 
War and Pagale Zings and released the following morning to irrigate the fields 
throughout Sheldan and Tukcha Chutsos.
It was decided that this new system would be tried for twenty years, after which 
its effectiveness would be re-evaluated. Over thirty-five years have passed, the system 
continues to remain the same, and the general consensus is that no modifications are 
presently required (Tiwari & Gupta, 2003).
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Saboo
Situated at approximately 3,600 metres altitude and 10 kilometres to the southeast 
of Leh, lies the village of Saboo. Of the villages investigated in this case study, Saboo 
was the closest proximity to Leh. The name Saboo, or alternately spelled Sabu, is 
derived from an older name, Saphut, which refers to the good fertility of the soil in the 
area. Located on the north side of the Indus River, Saboo has a southern aspect, and its 
main tokpo (Saboo Tokpo) is fed by the melting glaciers in the Ladakh Range to the 
north.
Figure 7: Map of Saboo showing chutso divisions.
According to the 2001 census, the village of Saboo has a population of 1,680 
which comprises 261 households (DSEA, 2006). These households are divided into five 
chutsos: Phoo Chutso, Saboo Chutso, Meyak Chutso, Yognos Chutso, and Ayou Chutso 
(see Figure 7). Zong is not a chutso, but rather the estate land of the gompa.
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The jurisdiction of the churpuns in Saboo is from the top of Phoo Chutso to the 
bridge that divides Yognos Chutso from Ayou Chutso. Ayou Chutso has no right, legal 
or traditional, to the the water from Saboo Tokpo and therefore is not under the purview 
of a churpun. Instead, Ayou relies exclusively on chumik water for irrigation, as well as 
for all other domestic water needs. The three small zings in Ayou are filled by water 
diverted from the chumiks by the bridge. In earlier times, one churpun was needed to 
oversee the water management for all of Saboo. As more land came under cultivation, a 
second churpun came to be required. Now, more than 400 hectares of land are under 
cultivation in Saboo, and accordingly, more churpuns are necessary to oversee the proper 
irrigation of this land. There are presently four churpuns in Saboo, one for each of the 
four other chutsos.
Coinciding with the agricultural season in Saboo, the churpuns’ duties begin in 
early April and end in early September, ceremoniously marked by a puja. At the 
beginning of each agricultural season, new churpuns are appointed. It is the duty of the 
churpun to inform each household when it is their time to irrigate each of their fields; the 
churpun will visit (or, in recent times, telephone) the household and give advance notice 
that their barley fields, for example, are to be irrigated the following day. One household 
described that their three barley fields took approximately three days to irrigate, then they 
would wait about a week or so until the churpun notified them again that it was their turn 
to irrigate those fields for another three days. Formerly, the churpun was compensated 
for his labour with grain; each family gave the churpun a donation of barley or wheat. 
Currently, compensation is monetary. A cash payment is made by each household to the 
churpun in their chutso. One participant reported paying the churpun a total of 75 INR
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for the entire agricultural season, though each family’s payment amount is determined by 
the size of their land holdings.
Each churpun is appointed by the village goba. The goba, or traditional village 
head, is himself an appointed representative, and serves as a government employee for a 
maximum of three years. The churpuns and the goba work together to solve water- 
related problems. For example, a churpun will inform the goba if a villager is caught 
diverting water to his field without the permission of the churpun. The goba will then 
determine the severity of the infraction, in this case theft, and issue a penalty accordingly. 
Penalties are typically in the form of a fine; the amount of the fine is reflective of the 
severity of the infraction. In cases where a large amount of water has been stolen, or 
when the village is experiencing immediate water shortage, fines can reach 500 INR or 
more.
Fed by the tokpo, the zings in Saboo are filled through the night and used the 
following day to irrigate the fields that lie below. Though rare, after a heavy rain, it is 
possible to fill all zings in one day. Phoo Chutso relies primarily on the tokpo for its 
water needs, and uses Zing Samo. Saboo Chutso uses Zing Lo, Meyak Chutso uses Zing 
Yourgog, and Yognos Chutso uses Zing Yognos. Zing Yognos, which filled by both the 
tokpo and nearby chumiks, serves the majority of the population of Saboo, and so in 
2001, it was renovated and enlarged by Leh Nutrition Project (see Figure 8). Each zing 
has an overflow outlet and a locking valve, which only the churpun has the key to open 
and close (see Figure 9). Thus, the zings are under complete control of the churpuns.
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Figure 8: Zing Yognos when empty. Figure 9: Overflow outlet and
locking valve on Zing Yognos.
Numerous chumiks are located throughout the village of Saboo. Villagers rely 
primarily on the chumiks as a year-round source of potable water. Approximately six 
hand-pumps are situated throughout the village, and can also be relied upon year-round 
for drinking water, as they are not susceptible to freezing during the winter months. In 
addition to the hand-pumps, the state government has also recently installed a piped- 
water system which brings potable meltwater from the kangri (glacier-covered mountain) 
above Saboo, down to various points around the village. In the winter, however, these 
pipes are drained and closed, or otherwise they would freeze and burst.
In Saboo, both wheat and barley are grown as the principal crops . The growing 
period for wheat is about 120 days, from the time of ploughing and sowing until the 
harvest, compared to about 90 days for barley. Therefore, the agricultural season begins 
first with the wheat fields, and then, approximately one month later, the barley fields are 
begun. The irrigation schedule in Saboo is described in the following paragraphs.
23 From PioGang in Phoo Chutso to Zong, however, only barley is grown. The altitude is higher here 
(3,700 metres) and so the climate is colder, making the growing season in this area too short to grow wheat.
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The irrigation schedule begins in early spring, usually early April, when the 
meltwater begins to flow down through the tokpo24. First, the wheat fields receive tha 
chu, or dry water. Tha chu moistens the barren soil in preparation for ploughing and 
sowing. In each chutso, the churpun selects the order that each field is watered. The 
churpun diverts the water from the tokpo to a particular yura and then instructs the 
families, whose fields lie along that yura, to, one after the other, divert water to their 
fields. If the land is flat, then the water will not flow. Families, therefore, must furrow 
each of their fields, according to the field’s particular slope and characteristics, so that 
when water is diverted to their fields, it will flow through each bed to the next. Once all 
fields along a particular yura have been watered, the churpun closes that yura with a ska 
(closure comprised of boulders and sod). If the ska is found washed away, then the 
churpun knows someone has diverted the water without his approval, and violators are 
penalized. The churpun then diverts the water from the tokpo to another yura, and 
instructs those families to irrigate their fields (see Figure 10). The period of time that 
each field receives water depends on the size of the field. One by one, water is allowed 
to flow through each yura and all the fields are watered; the churpun ensures that no field 
in the village is missed. After all the wheat fields have received tha chu, then the barley 
fields receive tha chu. About a month will have passed from the time the first wheat 
fields received tha chu until the time they are ploughed and sown. Crops are ploughed 
and sown simultaneously, and once the wheat fields have been ploughed and sown, then 
so are the barley fields. It takes about one month for all the fields to be complete.
24 Sometimes, before the kangri begins to melt in spring, khyak chu, or the remainder o f the frozen winter 
water in the tokpo and zings, is released to water the grazing fields.
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Figure 10: Yura running between footpath and field.
Once small shoots begin to appear, the wheat fields are given their first irrigation, 
called dot chu. After all the wheat fields have received dol chu, which takes about two 
weeks, then all the barley fields receive dol chu. Next, the wheat fields are given shak 
chu, or the second irrigation. Shak chu is given once the shoots become dry and yellow 
in colour. It takes about two weeks for all wheat fields to receive shak chu, and then 
afterward, all the barley fields receive shak chu. It is vital to irrigate on time at these 
phases (dol chu and shak chu), otherwise the crops will die. From this point onwards, the 
crops are strong and healthy, so now more water can be given; all the crops in the village 
are watered every week or so until they are harvested. The year this research was 
conducted, the growing season ended in the first week of September, and by the end of 
the month, the harvest had been completed.
71
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Matho
Across from Saboo, on the south side of the Indus River, lies the village of Matho. 
According to the 2001 census, the village of Matho has a population of 1,288 which 
comprises 258 households (DSEA, 2006). Matho is situated at approximately 3,600 
metres altitude, and about 25 kilometres southeast from Leh. Though not too far from the 
region’s capital, because of its location on the lesser travelled side of the river, Matho is 
in many ways more remote than its proximity to Leh might suggest. This made 
communications and gathering information in Matho quite challenging. Therefore, the 
data for Matho is quite limited, though important to include nonetheless.
Having a northern aspect, Matho would be much drier were it not for Matho 
Kangri, which lies just south of the village, at 5,800 metres altitude, among the Stok 
Mountain Range. Matho Kangri provides the village of Matho with an abundant source 
of water as its melting glacier feeds the village’s main tokpo. Participants in Matho 
reported that water from this kangri is plentiful enough such that there is no longer a need 
for a churpun. In fact, there has not been a churpun in Matho for some time now. It is 
unknown if any chutsos exist in Matho any longer, however there did exist a defined 
schedule of when each villager could divert water from the main stream to irrigate their 
fields. The year this research was conducted, the harvest in Matho commenced in mid- 
August, beginning with the harvesting of fodder for the livestock, to dry and store for the 
coming winter. It is expected that the remainder of the harvest would have been 
completed by mid-September. The irrigation channels seemed well-maintained; villagers 
are responsible for minor repairs to the yuras and the government is responsible for major 
repairs. The heavy rains and flooding that occurred throughout much of Ladakh during
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July and August 2006 did not have a significant impact on Matho, however, it was 
reported that significant repairs were necessary in Matho after heavy rains of the previous 
summer of 2005. There is one large zing in Matho, which is still used to store water 
throughout the night to be released the following day to thirsty fields below it. In the 
absence of the churpun, it was unknown to the participants interviewed as to who 
maintains and operates the zing.
In the summer time, chumiks become available as a source of potable water. 
People in Matho have historically met all their year-round household water needs from 
the tokpo, and report that water quality has not been a problem. However, a year ago, 
hand-pumps began to appear throughout the village, financed and installed by the state 
government. Now, collecting water for household needs from the hand-pumps has 
replaced collecting water from the tokpo for many families in Matho. It is unclear 
exactly what the water source for the hand-pumps is, but it is suspected that the water is 
from an underground aquifer. Some hand-pumps are operational throughout the winter, 
but villagers who live nearby hand-pumps that are prone to freezing in winter, must resort 
to collecting their water from the tokpo. There have not been any reports of mechanical 
problems with the hand-pumps thus far, however villagers have not been taught how to 
repair them, and so, should they ever require repair, the government will have to be 
responsible for it.
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3.2.2 Kharu Block
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Figure 11: Map of Kharu Block.
Note: Map by Aaron Dana. Reprinted with permission.
Chemray
The village of Chemray is situated on the north side of the Indus River, at a 
distance of approximately 45 kilometres to the southeast of Leh. Chemray, or alternately 
spelled Chemrey, Chemre, or Chemde, has a southern aspect and lies at an elevation of 
3,700 metres. The other villages in this case study are all independent entities. Chemray, 
however, provides an interesting contrast to these other villages, in that Chemray is
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situated in a fairly long valley, between the upper village of Sakti and the lower village of 
Kharu (or alternatively, Kharoo). Of the three villages in this watershed, Sakti is the 
largest in terms of population, Chemray the longest (approximately 11.5 kilometres long), 
and Kharu the smallest, both in population and area (Dawa, Dana, & Namgyal, 2000). 
Two tokpos (Takkar Tokpo and Taknak Tokpo), originating from the melting snowbanks 
and glaciers of the Ladakh Range to the north of the watershed, flow through Sakti 
village and join at the chu dzomsa (confluence of two rivers) to become Chemray Tokpo. 
Chemray Tokpo then flows through the length of both Chemray and Kharu villages, until 
it joins the Indus River. Kharu village has no legal or traditional right to the water from 
the tokpo, and so instead, must rely on the chumik and spang water of Shagang Gnema 
Spang as the source for irrigating their fields (Dawa et al., 2000). Chemray and Sakti, on 
the other hand, both have rights to this water, and so over the centuries had to develop a 
system in order to share this water between the two villages. This system of sharing the 
water, called pabchu, “is perhaps unique to this watershed, though similar practices are 
prevalent in other large watersheds in the region” (Dawa et ah, 2000:237). Therefore, for 
Chemray, not only will the internal management of water within the village boundaries be 
described, but additionally, so will the management of water between the two villages.
According to the 2001 census, the village of Chemray has a population of 1,202 
which comprises 303 households (DSEA, 2006). These households are divided into four 
chutsos: Nala Chutso, Peu Chutso, Gamat Chutso, and Yognos Chutso. Chemray Tokpo 
provides the primary source of water for irrigation for all four chutsos in Chemray. In all 
chutsos but Nala Chutso, oozing spang water also feeds into the tokpo. Four families in 
Chemray, however, have no right to the tokpo; alternatively, they have an independent
25 Kaiaksa family, Jonggar family, and two families by the name o f  Tongstoth.
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zing and yura (Ramram) which channels the chumik and spang water from Dablung 
(Spang Chenmo) to irrigate their fields (Dawa et al., 2000). About five years ago, the 
Public Health & Engineering (PHE) department of the Government of Jammu and 
Kashmir installed a piped-water system throughout Chemray. This piped-water system, 
essentially a horizontal tube well, pumps potable water from an underground aquifer to 
tube wells and then distributes the water throughout the village via (above-ground) steel 
pipes. However, the pipes freeze in winter, rendering this system inoperable for upwards 
of six months of the year. Shortly after the installation of the piped-water system, the 
state government also installed several hand-pumps throughout the village for drinking 
water (see Figure 12). Fortunately, the hand-pumps do not suffer from the same freezing 
problem in winter, and thus provide the villagers with a reliable, perennial source of 
drinking water. Participants reported that within Peu and Gamat Chutsos, the chumiks 
serve as an additional source of year-round potable water.
Figure 12: Hand-pump in front of Kalakska house.
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Numerous zings, speckled throughout the village, are fed by Chemray Tokpo. 
During the agricultural season, by diverting water from the tokpo to the zings, the zings 
are typically filled throughout the night, and then the following day, the water contained 
in the zings is released to irrigate the fields below. There are two zings in Nala Chutso: 
Nala Kogma Zing and Nala Yokma Zing. There are three zings in Peu Chutso: Kuyur 
Zing, Yarlok Zing, and Ramram Zing. There is one zing in Gamat Chutso, named Zeuma 
Zing, and one zing in Yognos Chutso, named Zing Chenmo.
At the top of the village, water is plentiful, so no churpun is needed to manage the 
water in Nala and Peu chutsos. Water is in shorter supply as it reaches the lower chutsos 
of Gamat and Yognos, therefore Gamat Chutso and Yognos Chutso each have one 
churpun. The two churpuns in Chemray, during the agricultural season of 2006, were 
from the Changtukpa family in Gamat and the Numpa family in Yognos.
Each agricultural season, new churpuns are appointed by the chagzot, or manager, 
of the Chemray gompa. The chagzot has a list of all the households in each chutso, and 
by rotation, as they have done for centuries, each household has its turn to carry out the 
yearly churpun duties. The newly appointed churpuns are each ceremoniously presented 
with an official thetse (carved wooden seal), over which they have control throughout 
the current agricultural season (see Figure 13). They retain possession of the thetses until 
the following year, when they are returned to the gompa to be given to the next churpuns. 
The thetses are used by the churpuns to officially mark the closing of a particular yura, in 
order to divert water to another yura. The churpun closes the yura with a ska (closure 
comprised of boulders and sod) and then stamps the thetse into the wet soil or clay of the 
yurgo (the head of the yura) to cast an imprint of the seal. If the impression in the soil is
26 Formerly called a pangya.
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found washed away, then the churpun knows someone has diverted the water without his 
approval, and violators are penalized.
Figure 13: An official thetse.
In the past, penalties were jointly determined by the villagers of the chutso where 
the infraction occurred and meted by the churpun. For example, the perpetrator of the 
violation could be made to do extra community work, give a public apology for their 
wrongdoing, or give a gift of chang (local brew made from fermented barley) and kataks 
(ceremonial white scarves) to the aggrieved party. Nowadays, a fine of about 500 INR is 
the typical penalty for stealing water, though the severity of the fine depends on the 
severity of the water scarcity in the village at the time that the infraction was committed.
The villages of Chemray and Sakti were always in an adversarial situation as they 
were dependent on the same tokpo for irrigation, however Sakti, located in the upper 
reaches of the watershed, obviously enjoyed a natural advantage (Dawa et al., 2000). 
Disputes inevitably arose between the two villages, and in an attempt to resolve these
disputes, a system of sharing water for irrigation developed between Chemray and Sakti.
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This centuries old system is known as the Pabchu system. From the verb pabches 
meaning to lower or bring down, the literal translation of pabchu is then ‘to bring down 
water’. For equitable distribution of the limited water in the watershed, for two nights 
and the intervening day, the water from Taggar and Taknak Tokpos is diverted to 
Chemray, by closing the mouths of all the upstream yuras in Sakti. “The earliest 
historical reference to the Pabchu system is found in an order issued by King Jamyang 
Namgyal in 1571 A.D.” (Dawa et al., 2000:245). The particulars of the pabchu evolved 
over time, and then, during the reign of King Nyima Namgyal (1694-1729), the 
agreement of the pabchu was formally codified; this original document is, still to this day, 
held in trust by the Chemray Gompa.
Barley is the principal crop grown in Chemray, although, in some fields, peas and 
mustard are also grown27. The growing, and irrigation, of barley follows a precise 90-day 
schedule. At the onset of the agricultural season, typically in early May, the ambient 
temperature is not high enough to induce melting of the snowbanks, let alone the glaciers. 
At this time, khyak chu, or the remainder of the frozen winter water in the tokpo and 
zings, is given to moisten the barren soil in preparation for ploughing and sowing. 
Within one week, all fields in the entire village receive this initial watering. A ten-day 
break elapses, and then all the fields are ploughed and sown over the course of the next 
seven days.
After one week, small shoots begin to appear. The amount of water in the tokpo 
at this time is critical, as this is the time when the crop requires its first irrigation, called 
dol chu. The melting of the snowbanks and glaciers is generally underway by this time,
27 Typically wheat is not grown in Chemray; the altitude is 3,700 metres and so the climate is colder, 
making the growing season too short to grow wheat, though a very limited area in the lower reaches o f the 
village is used to grow wheat.
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however water levels in the tokpo are usually still insufficient to provide enough water 
for the first irrigation, such that the villagers of Chemray must ask for the pabchu to 
begin.
In Chemray, the agricultural season, and therefore the water management system, 
is dictated by the Tibetan Calendar. On the third day of the third month of the Tibetan 
Calendar, the chagzot and the two churpuns go to the gabokuna (the name of the deity in 
the centre of Sakti) and have a puja, giving offerings of kataks and chang. In earlier 
times, it was on this day that pabchu would begin. Nowadays, this day is marked by a 
puja, but the actual pabchu does not begin until the eighth day of the fifth month of the 
Tibetan Calendar. On the eighth day of the fifth month, Chemray villagers bring sha (the 
meat, typically of a sheep or goat) and chang to the goba of Sakti and ask that pabchu 
begin the following day28. This customary offering is aptly named Sha-Chang and is 
contributed by the Chemray Gompa, though of late, 500 INR is paid in lieu of the sha. 
The request is granted, and the next day begins pabchu.
It takes eight days time to irrigate all of Chemray’s fields -  pabchu coincides with 
days one and two of this irrigation schedule. Throughout day one, the village of Sakti has 
rights to the tokpo, but late that afternoon, one representative from each family in both 
Gamat and Yognos Chutsos29, led by the two churpuns and a lama from the Chemray 
Gompa (usually the chagzot), departs for Sakti, diverting the water from various yuras 
along the way. The churpuns close all the yuras above Zeuma Zing, with skas and affix 
an impression of the thetses on each of the yurgos, up to the chu dzomsa. At that point,
28 In times o f  extreme water shortage, Chemray may need to begin pabchu earlier than the agreement 
allows. If Chemray needs water, and is unable to wait until pabchu, then the churpuns bring chang to the 
goba of Sakti and ask for shabe (a “special request” for an early pabchu).
29 All the families o f  Gamat and Yognos Chutsos are responsible for the management o f  pabchu, however, 
the families o f  Nala and Peu Chutsos do not participate in the pabchu.
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one churpun proceeds to Takkar Tokpo, and the other churpun to Taknak Tokpo, 
repeating the procedure on each yura throughout Sakti. In the meantime, each of the 
representatives station themselves at each of the yurgos, where they will stand watch over 
the yuras to guard the water from potential theft. If a family refuses to send a 
representative to stand watch over night, they will be charged a fine of 500 INR by the 
other families. At about 5:00 pm, the five yuras between Zeuma Zing and Zing Chenmo 
are simultaneously closed, and representatives from Yognos position themselves as the 
watch and ward of these yurgos. The representatives camp out at their yurgos through 
the nightas the water flows directly down the tokpo and into both Zeuma Zing and Zing 
Chenmo. The two zings are filled, relatively equally, for the whole night and the water is 
released into the yuras under them and used to irrigate the fields throughout Gamat and 
Yognos Chutsos the following day. The two churpuns and the lama walk around upper 
Chemray and throughout Sakti during the night30 to confirm that the water is properly 
distributed and to ensure that no one tries to steal water. If it is discovered that water has 
been illegally diverted to a yura in upper Chemray or Sakti at some point through the 
night, the perpetrators of the violation are charged 500 INR.
Throughout the following day and the next night, the representatives continue to 
stand watch and the water continues to flow down the tokpo into the two lower chutsos of 
Chemray, however, between 10:00 am -  5:00pm on day two, some areas of upper 
Chemray and Sakti receive a special concession, called Do-Tam. “Do-Tam means a 
mark on a stone, a sort of gauge to determine the depth of water to be let into the yura” 
(Dawa et al., 2000:247). When shadows begin to appear on the hillsides, at about 5:00
30 It is due to these night duties o f  the churpun that women have traditionally not served in this role. 
Besides it being considered unsafe for women, it would also take them away from their babies, who likely 
would require nursing through the night.
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pm, on the evening of the second day, Do-Tam ceases and the yurgos of those yuras are 
again sealed. Water continues to flow down the tokpo and fill Zeuma Zing and Zing 
Chenmo throughout the second night, until the sparrows begin to chirp (at approximately 
4:00 am on the morning of day three). This signals the time for the representatives of 
Gamat and Yognos, who have been guarding the yuras, to return to their homes -  the end 
of pabchu -  and the farmers of both Sakti and Nala and Peu Chustsos in Chemrey to 
again divert the water from the tokpo to their yuras - the beginning of the six day non- 
pabchu period.
In Chemray, throughout the non-pabchu period, water from the tokpo is used, 
during all the days, by the villagers of Nala and Peu Chutsos, and during the nights, 
alternating between Gamat and Yognos Chutsos, in an arrangement called ziray (Dawa et 
al., 2000). On the nights of days three and four, the villagers of Gamat get the ziray, so 
they close all the yuras of Nala and Peu and divert water throughout the nights to Zeuma 
Zing. Zeuma Zing is filled and the water stored for subsequent use, to irrigate the fields 
in Gamat Chutso. On the fifth night, the villagers of Yognos get the ziray, so they close 
all the yuras of Nala, Peu, and Gamat and divert water throughout the nights to Zing 
Chenmo. Zing Chenmo is filled, and the water is stored and later used during the day for 
irrigation in Yognos Chutso. On the sixth and seventh nights, Gamat again receives the 
ziray, and on the eighth night, the ziray goes to Yoknos. Thus, over the six non-pabchu 
days, Gamat receives water four nights and Yognos two nights.
After all of Chemray’s fields have received their first irrigation, then a break of 
seven days follows. Following this break, Chemray’s fields receive their second 
irrigation. If necessary, another pabchu is requested. Every time Chemray requires an
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additional pabchu, a pot of chang is delivered one day earlier to the goba of Sakti. Once 
the second irrigation cycle has been completed, which also takes eight days, another 
seven-day break follows. A third eight-day irrigation cycle ensues. At this point, all 
subsequent irrigations occur at shorter intervals. After a break of five days, all fields are 
irrigated for a fourth time over the course of eight days. Then, after another five-day 
break transpires, all fields receive their fifth and final irrigation. This final irrigation 
takes seven days to complete and is then followed by the harvest.
Harvest usually takes place during the end of the seventh month of the Tibetan 
Calendar. The year this research was conducted, Peu Chutso began the harvest in the last 
week of August, next Gamat and Yognos Chutsos harvested their crops, and finally, Nala 
Chutso finished the harvest at the end of the first week in September.
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3.2.3 Khaltse Block
In Khaltse Block, the villages of Alchi and Hemis Shukpachan were investigated 
(see Figure 14).
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Figure 14: Map of Khaltse Block.
Note: Map by Aaron Dana. Reprinted with permission.
Alchi
Approximately 70 kilometres southwest from Leh, on the south side of the Indus 
River, lies the village of Alchi. Alchi is located on an alluvial fan (Dawa et al., 
2000:236). At 3,250 metres altitude, Alchi was the village with the lowest altitude in this 
case study. Like Matho, Alchi has a northern aspect, but unlike Matho, “Alchi suffers 
from a chronic shortage of water as there are no glaciers above” (Dawa et al., 2000:237). 
Instead, Alchi’s water is dependant on the previous winter’s snowfall, mainly from 
Stakspi La (5,200 metres) to the south. However, “the limited snowbanks are not
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adequate enough to last the entire agricultural season. Consequently, shortage of water 
during the latter part of the season is the constraint as far as this village is concerned,” 
whereas most other villages in the district experience water shortage in early spring 
(Dawa et al., 2000:237). Due to its chronic water shortage, the agricultural season in 
Alchi is typically only four months in duration -  from late March until late July -  and 
therefore, it is significantly shorter, and ends earlier, than most other villages in the 
district. This fact makes Alchi particularly interesting to study. The limited supply of 
water forces Alchi to be judicious in the distribution of water. The following section 
documents in precise detail the strictly regimented schedule that villagers adhere to in 
order to ensure enough water reaches each and every field in the village during the 
agricultural season, such that there will be enough food to eat for the remaining eight 
months of the year.
According to the 2001 census, the village of Alchi has a population of 741 which 
comprises 148 households (DSEA, 2006). These households are divided into four 
chutsos: Gompa Chutso, Shangrong Chutso, Choskor Chutso, and Yulkor Chutso. 
Historically, there has been one churpun for all of Alchi, however due to both increasing 
water scarcity and population, the duties of the churpun have become too taxing for only 
one person to manage such that, last year, instead of electing one churpun as usual, the 
villagers of Alchi elected four -  one for each chutso.
But the agricultural season of 2006 was different once again. The previous winter 
experienced more snow than usual, and so the subsequent snowmelt during the 
agricultural season was sufficient to only require the work of one churpun. The churpun 
elected was from the Shangrong Chutso. The churpun is typically elected in March and
85
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the end of their responsibilities is marked by the end of the harvest (the end of July). 
Each spring there is a new election. The responsibilities of the churpun are to ensure the 
proper distribution of water, to watch for anyone stealing water, and to penalize those 
caught stealing. Penalties for stealing typically result in a fine of 100 INR, but increase 
with the severity of the crime. For example, if someone were to divert water without 
permission during a time of extreme scarcity, the penalty would be much more severe 
than if the same offence were committed in times of adequate water amounts.
Churpuns are compensated for their work by the villagers themselves, but no 
money changes hands. Because the churpun’s time during the agricultural season is spent 
managing the village’s water and not tending to his fields, the rest of the village ensures 
that he has enough food to eat by compensating him with food. Each household gives the 
churpun equal amounts of barley -  one bucket or approximately 15 kilograms -  though 
smaller households give a little less.
The goba, still plays an active role in Alchi. Though historically this position was 
inherited down a family line, now, each year, a new goba is selected by lottery. The year 
this research was conducted, the goba was Tsering Stobden of the Shanara family of the 
Shangrong Chutso. Traditionally, the goba’s main role was that of the village problem 
solver. For example, together with the churpun, the goba resolves quarrels over water. 
Whomever is found to be at fault, the perpetrator of the violation, must apologize and 
give kataks to the aggrieved party. Nowadays, the goba receives a small salary, of about 
3,000-4,000 INR per year, from the state government. In return, the goba is expected to 
assist in the carrying out of government programs and administration, in addition to 
maintaining the goba’s traditional roles.
86
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
There is one zing in Alchi, Khangltak Zing, which is located high above the 
village. There is a locking door on the zing that only the churpun has the key to. 
Meltwater is collected into the zing in the night, and released to fields during the day, as 
the churpun deems necessary. This zing, however, is currently in poor condition. It has 
been leaking and so is inadequate for storing night water, and has not been in use for 
about three years. Individual storage tanks are not permitted (as they would be akin to 
hoarding water and further cause the deterioration of the traditional distribution system).
Traditionally, the yuras in Alchi were built by the villagers, using mud and stones. 
The villagers have collectively been responsible for the maintenance and repair of yuras 
and the zing, however, in recent years, the state government has provided some assistance 
in this regard. For example, heavy rains occurred throughout Ladakh, during late July 
and early August of 200631, causing some yurgos in Alchi to be washed away. Alchi 
residents repaired this damage temporarily, but await the state government to finance and 
conduct more permanent repairs. The government has also been employing migrant 
workers to replace the old yuras with new ones made of cement (see Figure 15). 
Participants reported that, in an attempt to make one bag of cement mix go farther, 
workers have been witnessed watering it down too much. There is fear that these new, 
modem yuras are not going to last anywhere as long as the old ones. Additionally, the 
new ones will not be able to be repaired using local materials, and so the government will 
have to be relied upon to fix any minor or major problem. This government assistance 
has been helpful in many ways, but disabling in others. Ladakhis used to be completely 
self-reliant, but now dependence on external assistance has developed, leaving people
31 The heavy rains did not benefit the crops during the growing season, but nor did they damage them as the 
harvest had been completed by late July.
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awaiting assistance, while their zing, for example, has been in disrepair for about three 
years.
>
Figure 15: Workers replacing previous mud and stone yuras with cement yuras.
About ten years prior, the state government began installing a piped-water system 
throughout Alchi. Potable water from snowmelt is funnelled from high above the village 
through steel pipes and distributed to each of the four chutsos (see Figure 16). 
Participants interviewed reported that the pipe leading to their neighbourhood, which they 
share with about ten other families, was installed just three years ago. Prior to the 
installation of the piped-water system, villagers met their year-round drinking water 
needs from the main tokpo, Alchi Tokpo. At the end of October/beginning of November, 
the pipes are drained and closed32, otherwise the water in the pipes would freeze in
32 Tsering Angchuk o f Haltukpa house in Yulkor Chutso is a government employee who is responsible for 
this task, as well as for the maintenance/repair o f  the pipes.
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winter33 and burst the pipes. From that point on, until late April/early May, villagers 
collect their drinking water from the main tokpo. One participant interviewed reported 
that twice a day in winter, she walks to the tokpo to collect water for her family’s 
drinking, cooking, and (dish) washing needs (bathing and clothes washing takes place at 
the water’s edge, and so does not require the transport of water). On each trip, she 
collects two 20 litre containers of water for her family of three, which averages out to just 
over 25 litres of water per person per day. This participant estimated that each trip took 
approximately five minutes to walk to the tokpo, five minutes to fill her containers, and 
five minutes to walk back to her house. Thus, for her, at least 30 minutes of each day, for 
about six months of the year, is spent collecting water.
Figure 16: Piped-water system.
33 The pipes in Alchi are wrapped, as are those in Hemis Shukpachan (to be discussed in the following 
section), but perhaps because the water in Alchi’s pipes originates from snowmelt, it is colder and therefore 
more prone to freezing. Conversely, in Hemis Shukpachan, the water in the pipes is spring water, 
originating from the earth, which is perhaps slightly warmer than snowmelt water in Alchi.
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Villagers in Choskor Chutso rely less on the tokpo as they have both chumiks and 
a hand-pump nearby. The hand-pump does not freeze during winter and so provides this 
chutso with a convenient perennial source of drinking water. This hand-pump, the only 
one in the village, was installed by the state government about five years ago. Villagers 
in Yulkor Chutso, however, experience more hardship during the winter. None of the 
yuras within this chutso contain any water during the winter, so villagers who live in this 
area must walk long distances to retrieve drinking water from the main tokpo. A hand- 
pump in this chutso would significantly ease their burden, reported one participant.
Regarding water quality, participants commented that the water quality is 
deteriorating. Due to an influx of migrant workers to assist with the harvest in Alchi, and 
many other villages throughout Ladakh, a number of outsiders, unaccustomed to the rules 
regarding water usage, have been polluting the water source. For example, some of these 
migrant workers have been witnessed washing in the tokpo and using it as a toilet. 
Traditionally, it was everyone’s collective duty to keep the tokpo clean for drinking 
water, and certain tributaries were dedicated for washing water and irrigation. Polluting 
the village’s main drinking water source was unheard of, and accordingly, no rules were 
established to penalize those caught polluting water. It is unsure whether this current 
pollution has yet led to any incidents of health issues, though government sources concur 
that the only sources of potable water in Alchi are chumiks and a hand-pump (DSEA, 
2006). However, these two sources are located at significant distance from the majority 
of Alchi’s residents, and so in winter, when the piped-water system is inoperable, 
collecting drinking water from the tokpo remains the more preferred option for most 
people.
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Barley is the main crop grown in Alchi, but mustard seed, vegetables, apples, 
apricots, and walnuts are grown as well. Having a longer growing period -  the growing 
period for wheat is about 120 days compared to about 90 days for barley -  wheat would 
require more water to grow, and so, due to the shortage of water in Alchi, wheat is not 
grown. Villagers in Alchi adhere to a precise irrigation schedule in order to ensure that 
enough water reaches all of the fields during the agricultural season. The following 
paragraphs describe this schedule.
Ston chu, or autumn water, refers to the watering of the fields in October and 
November, so that the water soaks into the soil to freeze through winter. In spring, this 
frozen water melts, priming the fields to be ploughed in late March/early April. Having 
received ston chu, fields do not need to be watered before ploughing. In Alchi, two 
chutsos, Yulkor and Gompa, receive ston chu. The other two chutsos, Shangrong and 
Choskor, both have very steep slopes, so they do not receive ston chu. In autumn, after 
the harvest, the fields are barren. If the fields on such steep slopes were to receive ston 
chu, instead of being absorbed by the soil, the water would just run off, likely carrying 
the soil with it. Instead, fields in Shangrong and Choskor receive tha chu, or dry water, 
which refers to the watering of the dry fields prior to ploughing.
Alchi’s snow usually begins to melt in late March/early April, at which point tha 
chu begins. The order in which fields receive pre-ploughing water is determined by a 
lottery system. Families’ names are written on ballots (two families per ballot) and when 
drawn, those two families are permitted to water their fields for 24 hours. Only tha chu is 
by lottery and only during tha chu do each family receive water for the same amount of 
time. In all subsequent waterings though, the churpun selects the order that each field is
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watered. Typically, the churpun, starting at the field at the top of each yura and working 
downward34, instructs families, one after the other, to water their fields, ensuring that 
each field is watered. The churpun marks the ska with a pile of stones. If the stones are 
found moved or washed away, then he knows someone has diverted the water without his 
approval. Violators are penalized. The period of time that each field receives water is no 
longer equal, but rather depends on the size of the field.
Those families in Yulkor and Gompa who received ston chu, plough and sow 
their fields first, and after all of Shangrong and Choskor families have received tha chu, 
then they too plough and sow their fields. If water is scarce, then those who plough first, 
Yulkor and Gompa, receive dol chu first. Dol chu is the first irrigation given after the 
shoots appear. If there is sufficient water, then all four chutsos receive dol chu 
simultaneously. After all chutsos have received dol chu, then Yulkor and Gompa receive 
shak chu, or the second irrigation given once the shoots become dry and yellow in colour. 
If too much water is given at this stage, the water will rot and spoil the crops, therefore 
limited water is given at shak chu. Afterward, Shangrong and Choskor receive shak chu. 
Next, Yulkor and Gompa receive non chu, or the third irrigation. At this phase, the crops 
are strong and healthy, so now more water can be given. Then, Shangrong and Choskor 
receive non chu. From this point onwards, all the crops in the village are watered as 
much and as often as possible until they are harvested. The runoff from melting snow 
usually becomes a trickle in Alchi by July, and the harvest is coordinated accordingly. In 
Alchi, the harvest is typically finished by the end of July.
34 Or conversely, the churpun starts at the field at the bottom o f each yura and works upward.
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Hemis Shukpachan
The village of Hemis Shukpachan, lies approximately 85 kilometres to the 
northwest of Leh. Of the villages investigated in this case study, Hemis Shukpachan was 
the furthest away from Leh. Hemis Shukpachan is situated at an elevation of 3,700 
metres, on the north side of the Indus River, in a region of Ladakh known as Sham. The 
village is nestled in a valley between two steep rocky hillsides, with the glacier-covered 
Shaili Kangri (5,600 metres) visible to the north and the snow-covered Mangyu Ri (4,290 
metres) visible to the south. So Hemis Shukpachan is literally surrounded by mountains 
on all sides (see Figure 17).
F i g u r e  1 7 :  T h e  v i l l a g e  o f  H e m i s  S h u k p a c h a n .
As Hemis Shukpachan has a southern aspect, the village’s main tokpo (Akhur 
Tokpo) is fed by the melting glacier of the Shaili Kangri of the Ladakh Range to the 
north, cutting through the middle of the village, with the houses and fields to either side,
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and flowing down into a gorge to the south. The tokpo provides a perennial source of 
water for the village. Historically, villagers collected their drinking water from nearby 
springs in summer, and from the tokpo in winter, when the springs had been covered over 
by snow and/or ice. Though last year, a piped-water system was financed and installed 
by the government to carry potable water directly from the springs to various points 
throughout the village. Though this piped-water system is in its infancy, as of yet, it has 
not frozen and remains operable throughout the winter months.
According to the 2001 census, the village of Hemis Shukpachan has a population 
of 947 which comprises 182 households (DSEA, 2006). These households are divided 
into four chutsos. The names of these chutsos are unknown, and it was unclear if there is 
still someone responsible for the role of the churpun. It was evident however, that there 
did exist delineated rules for managing the water (i.e. when each household could divert 
water from the tokpo to irrigate their fields) and five operational zings were present 
throughout the village. One chutso was witnessed repairing a yura, which had been 
damaged by the previous days’ heavy rains, that brings water to the fields in their area. It 
took this group of villagers three days to rebuild this yura. It was reported that villagers 
had collectively built the yuras long ago and that they continue to repair them, however 
now the state government is relied upon for more major repairs to the water management 
infrastructure through out the village. For example, it was expected that before too long, 
a zing, which had been destroyed by the flooding from the heavy rains, would be repaired 
by the government. A participant commented that, were it not for the government’s 
assistance, it would otherwise take the villagers approximately one month of labour to 
rebuild this zing.
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In Hemis Shukpachan, due to its higher elevation, the agricultural season begins 
and ends a bit later than other villages. The agricultural season begins with the ploughing 
of the fields and sowing of the seeds in late May, however, at this time of year there is 
limited water, so irrigation schedules are more strictly adhered to. Once the glaciers 
above the village begin to melt in late June, water becomes more plentiful and, as a 
result, rules become more relaxed. The growing season continues through July and 
August, until the harvest. The year this research was conducted, the harvest, inaugurated 
with a puja (holy offering to the village oracles) by the Togoche family, began in the first 
week of September. It is expected that the remainder of the harvest would have been 
completed by the first week of October.
3.3 Conclusion
This chapter has provided, in detail, the case study of Ladakh, one of the few 
remaining pockets in India where the traditional water management systems are in place 
and in use. In Ladakh, the communal system of water management is broadly similar 
across the region, however, as described, within each particular village, subtle variations 
are present. In the subsequent chapter, these variations and the intricacies of the system 
as a whole are discussed with respect to how they have enabled Ladakh’s successful 
water management over the centuries.
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4. DISCUSSION
In the previous chapter, the case study of Ladakh was presented and the manner in 
which various Ladakhi communities have successfully managed their scarce water 
resources for centuries was described. This chapter begins with a discussion of the 
impact that the particular characteristics of both the resource and the resource users have 
had on water management in Ladakh, followed by an analysis of the particular 
institutional characteristics that have facilitated Ladakh’s success in the past and into the 
present. Next, the current challenges to sustaining the Ladakhi institution of communal 
water management into the future are identified, and the possibility of overcoming these 
challenges is explored. Finally, some of the ‘best practices’ of Ladakh’s communal water 
management system are brought to light in the hope that they might offer other 
communities insight on how to achieve more effective water management.
4.1 The Impact of Resource Characteristics on Water Management
Water is an example of a common-pool resource. Water shares the characteristics 
of subtractability and difficulty of exclusion with other common-pool resources, however 
water differs from other common-pool resources with regard to a series of other 
characteristics, namely renewability, scale, and cost of measurement. These 
characteristics are important because they influence how rules must be crafted in order to 
effectively manage water.
4.1.1 Renewability
Water is a renewable resource. “Renewability relates to the rate at which resource 
units that are extracted [or contaminated]...replace themselves over time” (Dietz et al., 
2002:22). The rate of renewability falls on a spectrum between resources that will not
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renew themselves within human timeframes, such as oil, to resources that will renew 
themselves within a few generations, such as forests, to resources that may renew 
themselves within a single generation, such as some animal species. “Resources that 
regenerate slowly are more challenging to manage” (Dietz et al., 2002:22). However, the 
rate of renewability depends highly on human interaction with the resource. For water, 
the rate of renewability depends on the source of the water, as well as on human 
interaction. Besides scant rainfall, Ladakhis’ water has traditionally been drawn from a 
mixture of glacial and snow melt, and surface springs and marshes. More recently, 
underground aquifers have also been utilized as a source for domestic water use. 
Regarding renewability, it is possible to recharge some underground aquifers within a 
resource user’s lifespan, however, it is difficult to imagine replenishing a mountain 
glacier within that same lifespan. Nevertheless, the Ladakhi communal water 
management system was established to manage glacial and snow meltwater, taking into 
consideration the availability of springs and marshes, but did not incorporate aquifer 
sources. As a result, Ladakhis do not traditionally possess knowledge regarding aquifer 
recharge and management. This poses a problem as Ladakhis move to a greater reliance 
on aquifer extraction for their water needs.
4.1.2 Scale
Scale refers to the size or “sheer extent of the resource” (Dietz et al., 2002:23). 
The scale of a common-pool resource impacts both the number of resource users and the 
heterogeneity of users and their uses. The greater the extent of the resource, the greater 
the likelihood that the resource users will be numerous. Conversely, a small pond will 
likely attract fewer users than a large ocean. To continue with this example, the group of
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users of the pond are likely to be less heterogeneous than the users of the ocean, and 
accordingly, the diversity of their usage will also be less heterogeneous. That being said, 
“the literature on local [emphasis added] common-pool resources suggests that a greater 
number of users does not necessarily impede cooperation, even though this may increase 
costs of devising, monitoring, and enforcing the rules,” though it suggests . ..“different, 
even opposing effects of heterogeneity among [users] on cooperation” (Dietz et al., 
2002:23). Cooperation among resource users is important as it facilitates the 
management of the resource.
Regarding the scale of water in Ladakh, as previously mentioned, Ladakh is a 
water scarce region. In the past, when most resource users in Ladakh were using the 
water for the same purposes, agriculture, homogeneity in usage facilitated cooperation. 
In the present, though Ladakhi society is still primarily agrarian, heterogeneity has 
emerged with respect to both water usage and population. With regard to usage, if less 
people are farming, this may put less pressure on finite water resource, which facilitates 
management. In contrast, if all tourists have flush toilets, then water usage goes up, and 
management is more difficult. Regardless of use though, the amount of water is finite. 
With regard to population, as new users are added to the system, both usage and 
heterogeneity will likely increase. New entrants add to the harvesting pressure and 
typically lack understanding of the rules, and therefore, increases in population 
heterogeneity will likely impede cooperation, thereby impeding successful management.
4.1.3 Cost of Measurement
The ability to measure common-pool resources is conducive to effective 
management of resources, and is vital to ensure long-term sustainability of a given
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resource. The quantity of the resource used must be measurable in order to ascertain 
current usage and to devise rules to limit usage, in order to ensure future usage. Cost of 
measurement is affected by the mobility and storability of the resource. “Mobile 
resources, such as wildlife and undamned river water, are much harder to measure and 
account for than stable resources, such as forests and pasture lands” (Dietz et al., 
2002:24). Water is highly mobile. The mobility of water makes measurement, and thus 
management, of water much more difficult. The ability to store mobile resources can 
mitigate this difficulty, as it facilitates measurement of the resource. In Ladakh, water is 
stored in zings, and available stock and usage is monitored by the churpun. Additionally, 
the smaller the scale of the common-pool resource, the easier it will be to measure, 
monitor, and manage (Dolsak & Ostrom, 2003).
4.2 The Impact of Resource User Characteristics on Water Management
While the focus of this research was on how the institutional characteristics of 
Ladakh’s communal water management have facilitated its effectiveness over time, 
attributes of both individual common-pool resource users and a group of users, as a 
whole, also influence institutional effectiveness; the preferences and assets of individuals, 
and the size, cohesion, trust, and homogeneity of groups all affect the institutions 
governing common-pool resources. Where water users “maintain frequent face-to-face 
communication and dense social networks -  sometimes called social capital -  that 
increase the potential for trust, allow people to express and see emotional reactions to 
distrust, and lower the cost of monitoring behavior and inducing rule compliance” 
institutional effectiveness is facilitated (Dietz et al., 2003:1908). This description aptly 
represents what relations between water users in Ladakh have been traditionally like. An
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intrinsic part of Ladakhi culture is the notion of mutual aid and, as a result, individuals 
are part of a web of supportive relationships. In addition to the communal system of 
water management, cooperation is formalized in a number of social institutions, such as 
the pashpun, bes, rares, and lhangsde. Thus, it is cooperation, rather than competition, 
that shapes Ladakhi society. Though additional data was not collected on the impacts 
that resource user characteristics have on water management, their influence is still 
worthy of mention.
4.3 Institutional Characteristics: Past and Present
The physical characteristics of water, as a common-pool resource, affect its 
manageability, as do the characteristics of the water resource users. However, these 
characteristics alone are not determinative. The institutional characteristics of Ladakh’s 
communal water management system must also be examined in order to explain its long- 
enduring success in sustaining local water resources, and ensuring water users’ 
compliance with rules, generation after generation. Two other common-pool resource 
characteristics -  subtractability and difficulty of exclusion -  apply to water as they do to 
all other common-pool resources. Ladakh’s success over the centuries can be attributed 
to its continued ability to overcome the common problems that these two characteristics 
can pose -  overuse and free-riding. Agreed-upon rules have been established to regulate 
overuse, however, traditionally in Ladakh, free-riding has not been a problem.
Most users [who] ... live in the same village where their families have lived 
for generations and intend to live in the same villages for generations to come 
[and] ... would prefer to find ways of limiting their own use so long as others 
also committed themselves to stinting. Village institutions would provide
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mechanisms to enable users to arrive at agreements (within the village 
context) that would assure each user that others were conforming to the 
agreed-on set of rules. (Dietz et al., 2002:12)
In village dynamics such as these, where water users maintain frequent face-to-face 
communication and dense social networks, the strategy of free-riding is minimized, and 
instead, coordination and cooperation dominates. Acknowledging that Ladakh has 
successfully managed scarce water resources for Centuries, the primary purpose of this 
research was to determine what institutional characteristics facilitated Ladakh’s success
O f
in the past. In order to analyze which institutional characteristics facilitated past and 
present success, Ostrom’s (1990) ‘design principles’ are used to frame the following 
discussion.
4.3.1 Clearly Defined Boundaries
In Ladakh, the boundaries of the water resource are clearly defined along village 
lines, and, within a village, with respect to who can use the resource, how they can use it, 
and who is excluded from using it. It is important to note that Ladakh’s system of 
communal water management pertains primarily to the agricultural usage of water. The 
right to withdraw water is held by village households, and determined based on the size 
of their agricultural landholdings.37 Water use from recent additional sources, such as 
hand-pumps, water deliver tankers, and piped-water systems, is not regulated and falls 
outside the boundaries of Ladakh’s communal water management system.
35 It is important to note that there are other factors that have also facilitated Ladakh’s success, such as 
climate and topography.
36 Though Leh is larger than a village, for the purposes o f this discussion, Leh will be included in the use of  
the word “village” unless otherwise noted.
37 More than 90% o f Ladakhi families own their own land (Page, 1993).
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How water is used has historically been limited to agricultural use, but it is not 
entirely clear whether the water usage is restricted to agricultural use. As livelihoods 
have recently become more diversified, so too have the types of water usage. For 
example, the introduction of tourism, has led to the construction of guesthouses with 
westem-style flush toilets38, which require water. Though these guesthouse owners do 
not necessarily have fields to water, they now have toilets to flush, and thus still have 
water needs. Guesthouses in Leh do not draw their water from yuras, but rather typically 
rely on the water delivery tankers for their water needs. It is not clear whether water 
users would be permitted to draw from the yuras for alternate uses such as these if so 
requested.
Due to Ladakh’s relative geographical isolation, the difficulty of excluding 
outsiders, until recently, has been minimal. Though outsiders regularly passed through 
Ladakh (i.e. caravan traders), outsiders settling in Ladakh was relatively rare. Now, 
however, outsiders settling in Ladakh has become more of a common occurrence. As a 
result, excluding outsiders has become more difficult. Exclusion has been accomplished 
by limiting harvesting based on agricultural landholding, and restricting withdrawal 
based on time, place, and quantity. Where exclusion has not been as successful, 
however, is with regard to the contamination of the water resource. The mobility of 
water makes monitoring its abuse difficult. Traditionally, it was everyone’s collective 
duty to keep the tokpo clean for drinking water, and certain tributaries were dedicated for 
washing water and irrigation. Polluting the village’s main drinking water source was 
unheard of, and accordingly, no rules were established to penalize those caught polluting 
water. Instead, social norms were relied on to ensure compliance. However, limiting
38 Traditional Ladakhi toilets are dry composting toilets, which do not require any water.
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access alone will not ensure the sustainability of the resource or the management 
institution, effective rules to minimize free-riding and overuse by the water users still 
need to be devised and enforced.
4.3.2 Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions
The success of Ladakh’s long-enduring institution of communal water 
management has been facilitated by the establishment of appropriation rules. Restrictions 
on water appropriation are based on time, place, and quantity and are carefully tailored to 
local conditions. Water users must contribute material, money, and/or labour to ensure 
provision and full functioning of the system.
Time Restrictions
Rigid time restrictions are placed on when individual users can irrigate their 
fields. In Alchi, two of the chutsos have very steep slopes, so they do not receive ston 
chu (autumn water) and instead receive tha chu the following spring. The order in which 
fields receive tha chu is determined by a lottery system and each family receives water 
for the same amount o f time. In Leh, restrictions, based on chutso divisions, are 
determined by both a temporal rotation system and a tokpo-wise rotation system. With 
the temporal rotation system, the day is divided into four time-periods, and during each 
period, water is diverted to a particular area of Leh. In the second system, water is 
diverted tokpo-wise between three tokpos, to irrigate the fields of three chutos in their 
vicinity. The system of water distribution between these three tokpos occurs in a pre­
determined order. In Chemray, the frequency of watering, their duration, and the 
intervening breaks are all pre-determined. From the time of sowing to the time of 
harvest, there are five periods of irrigation, each of eight days in length, and, between
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each irrigation, a break of pre-determined length occurs. In Saboo, irrigation timing is 
based on crop type. In order to take into consideration the growing period for each crop, 
irrigation is alternated between wheat and barley fields; wheat fields are irrigated first, 
followed by barley fields, and so on.
Place Restrictions
Restrictions on water appropriation are also based on place depending on local 
conditions. For example, where some users have access to alternate water sources 
restrictions are placed on their rights to withdraw water from the main tokpo. In 
particular, all water users in Kharu village (below Chemray), Ayou Chutso in Saboo, 
Skara Chutso in Leh, and four families in Chemray, have no legal or traditional right to 
the water from the tokpo in their respective villages, and so instead, must rely on the 
chumik and spang water for drinking, domestic, and irrigation purposes.
Usage of water for domestic purposes is not regulated with respect to time or 
quantity, however, where users can perform certain domestic tasks is regulated; 
regulation is achieved through social norms/coercion, not through the formal churpun 
monitoring mechanism. For example, washing of clothes and dishes is prohibited in 
certain streams from which people collect their drinking water. This has become less 
applicable as of late, for the usage of streams for drinking water has declined due to the 
introduction of hand pumps.
Quantity Restrictions
Rigid restrictions are placed on how much water individual users can withdraw to 
irrigate their fields. In Ladakh, when quantity is used to determine water appropriation, 
the measurement is not a metric volume, but rather is based on the amount of water
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necessary to irrigate a given field. In Saboo, one household described that their three 
barley fields took approximately three days to irrigate, and while it may seem that water 
is being distributed based on water time, it is more appropriate to say that water is being 
distributed based on the quantity needed. In Alchi, for the initial pre-sowing irrigations, 
all households receive the same amount of water (based on a time allocation), however 
subsequent irrigations are based on field size.
In general, across Ladakh, appropriation rules are relaxed when water availability 
is plentiful. For example, when there is heavy rainfall, or increased meltwater, water may 
be released to multiple users simultaneously, instead of in the normal ordered sequence. 
Participants noted that the role of the churpun becomes more difficult in times of water 
scarcity because his responsibility increases, whereas in times of plenty, the role of the 
churpun may cease altogether.
Provision Rules
There are two elements to the provision of water in Ladakh, the physical system 
itself, and the system of rules and regulations governing the provision of water. Water 
users make material, monetary, and labour contributions to both elements of the system, 
but these contributions vary across the region of Ladakh depending on the local 
conditions. Labour is contributed to the upkeep of the physical system. In earlier times, 
repair and maintenance of the entire system was completely carried out by the 
community. These days, each chutso in a given village is responsible for the 
maintenance of yuras in their area, that is, to keep the yuras clean and repair broken 
yuras, however dependence on the government has grown such that now major repairs 
and maintenance, such as repairing zings, are undertaken by the local administration.
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Material, monetary, and labour contributions are also made for the effective enforcement 
of rules and regulations. In Alchi, churpuns are compensated in-kind for their work by 
the villagers themselves; each household gives the churpun equal amounts of barley -  
one bucket or approximately 15 kilograms -  though smaller households give a little less. 
In Saboo and Leh, the churpun was formerly also compensated in-kind, but now is 
compensated monetarily for duration of the five-month growing period. In Saboo, the 
churpun is paid by each household based on the size of their landholdings; one participant 
reported paying the churpun a total of 75 INR for the entire agricultural season. In 
contrast, the churpuns in Leh receive fixed monetary remuneration of 3,000 INR from the 
local administration, which is not based on landholdings nor on the level of responsibility 
vis-a-vis water availability. Labour is also contributed to the enforcement of rules of 
regulations. For example, in Chemrary, each family from two of the four chutsos, must 
contribute a night watchman to prevent illegal appropriation. Failure to carry-out this 
duty when it is the family’s turn, results in a 500 INR fine to discourage further free­
riding.
4.3.3 Collective-choice arrangements
While the data acquired in this research did show the modification of operation 
rules over time, the degree to which individual users participated in and affected these 
changes was not determined.
4.3.4 Monitoring
Monitoring is an essential part of the Ladakhi communal water management 
institution, which has facilitated its success over the centuries. The churpuns, or village 
water managers, play the primary role of monitoring both the overriding conditions of the
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water resource as well as the behaviour of individual users. Churpuns are accountable to 
the water users through in-kind or monetary remuneration, with the exception of Leh, 
where the churpun is a government employee. In Alchi, churpuns are elected by the 
villagers, and in Saboo, churpuns are appointed by the goba. In both Chemray and Leh, 
however, by rotation, each household has its turn to carry out the yearly churpun duties. 
In cases like these, accountability to water users is further fostered.
The churpun’s duties are to ensure that all fields receive water and that all minor 
repair and maintenance works are carried out. It is the churpuns who determine when 
each household can divert water from the main tokpo to their fields, and if someone were 
to divert water to their fields without the churpun’s permission, it is the churpun’s 
responsibility to enforce institutional rules, help resolve conflicts, and to punish the 
perpetrator. Also, churpuns are responsible for ensuring that the zings are filled through 
the night and released the following day to irrigate the fields that lie below. As only the 
churpun has the key to open and close the locking valve on each zing, the zings are under 
complete control of the churpuns.
Perhaps the best example of monitoring was exhibited in Chemray. During the 
agricultural season, each churpun has exclusive control over an official thetse (carved 
wooden seal). The thetses are used to mark the closing of a yura, such that if the 
impression left by them has been disturbed, the churpun is able to easily detect 
unauthorized water use, and penalize the violator.
4.3.5 Graduated sanctions
Ladakh has always had a system of sanctions in place to deal with water users 
who violate the operational rules of the communal water management institution. Not
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only are there sanctions, but sanctions are graduated depending on the severity and 
context of the offence. Typically, sanctions are determined and meted out by the 
churpun. In Alchi, penalties for those caught stealing water, typically result in a fine of 
100 INR, but increase with the severity of the crime. For example, if someone were to 
divert water without permission during a time of extreme scarcity, the penalty would be 
much more severe than if the same offence were committed in times of adequate water 
amounts. In Leh, monetary and corporal punishment are the customary manners of 
punishment, and, as in Alchi, the severity of the violation determines the severity of the 
punishment. For example, in times of severe water shortage, or if large quantities of 
water have been illegally diverted, violators have been known to receive a hefty fine or 
beating. In Saboo, it is the goba who determines the severity of the infraction, and issues 
the penalty accordingly. Penalties are typically in the form of a fine and are meted out by 
the churpun; fines can reach 500 INR or more. Historically in Chemray, penalties were 
jointly determined by the villagers of the chutso where the infraction occurred, and meted 
out by the churpun. For example, the perpetrator of the violation could be made to do 
extra community work, give a public apology for their wrongdoing, or give a gift of 
chang (local brew made from fermented barley) and kataks (ceremonial white scarves) to 
the aggrieved party. Nowadays, a fine of about 500 INR is the typical penalty for 
stealing water, though the severity of the fine depends on the severity of the water 
scarcity in the village at the time that the infraction was committed. In villages or 
chutsos where no churpun exists, sanctions are meted out by fellow water users.
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4.3.6 Conflict-resolution mechanisms
In Ladakh, conflict-resolution mechanisms are achieved through official and 
unofficial avenues. In Saboo, the churpuns and the goba work together to solve water- 
related problems. For example, a churpun will inform the goba if a villager is caught 
diverting water to his field without the permission of the churpun. The goba will then 
determine the severity of the infraction, in this case theft, and issue a penalty accordingly. 
In Alchi, traditionally, the goba’s main role was that of the village problem solver. For 
example, together with the churpun, the goba resolves quarrels over water. Whomever is 
found to be at fault -  the perpetrator of the violation -  must apologize and give kataks to 
the aggrieved party. For Chemray and Sakti, the two villages, which share the same 
tokpo, the pabchu system was developed in order to attain a more equitable distribution 
of the water between the villages. Disputes inevitably arose between the two villages, 
and in an attempt to resolve these disputes, a system of sharing water for irrigation 
developed between Chemray and Sakti. In appreciation for sharing, a customary 
offering, aptly named Sha-Chang, is contributed by the Chemray Gompa to the goba of 
Sakti, though of late, 500 INR is paid in lieu of the sha (meat).
However, the social stigma of conflict, particularly of losing one’s temper, most 
likely plays the biggest role in mitigating conflicts over, inter alia, water in Ladakh. “A 
concern not to offend or upset another is deeply rooted in Ladakhi society; people avoid 
situations that might lead to friction or conflict. When someone transgresses this 
unwritten law ,... extreme tolerance is the response” (Norberg-Hodge, 1992:46). Because 
conflict avoidance is so deeply entrenched in Ladakhi society, third-parties often 
intervene as an intermediary. In contrast to western culture, this intervention is
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welcomed and is not seen as meddling. “This mechanism prevents problems from arising 
in the first place” and the possibility of direct confrontation can be avoided (Norberg- 
Hodge, 1992:47).
4.3.7 Minimal recognition of rights to organize
In previous times, the rights of Ladakhi water users to devise their own 
endogenous communal water management institution does not appear to have been 
challenged by external forces. Increasingly though, the Indian state is playing a greater 
role in the management of all aspects of Ladakh’s affairs, including its communal water 
management institution. For example, where traditionally the goba and churpun formed 
the highest level of authority within the institution, now a state-appointed level of 
government (the Panchayat) has assumed the top role of oversight. Although the 
Panchayat gives at least minimal recognition to the legitimacy of the Ladakhi’s rights to 
organize, develop and enforce rules of the communal water management system, it is 
foreseeable that this formerly endogenously governed institution could be usurped by 
external control.
4.4 Current Challenges to Sustaining the Ladakhi Institution
After analyzing the institutional characteristics of Ladakh’s communal water 
management system, which have facilitated its past success and have been maintained in 
the present, the research sought to ascertain whether there are factors that challenge the 
viability of sustaining Ladakh’s communal water management institution, presently and 
into the future. Ladakh’s system of communal water management is challenged by such 
broad external factors as population growth, urbanization, modernization, changing
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livelihoods, weakening of the social fabric, increasing dependence on government, and 
climate change, and these factors will be described throughout this section.
Until the borders between China and India were closed in 1959, Ladakhi 
livelihoods primarily consisted of pastoral nomadism, subsistence agriculture, and trade. 
After this time, trade into Central Asia ceased, however the looming war with China in 
1962 led to new roads being built into Ladakh, and a deployment of troops throughout the 
region. Since the 1960s, thousands of Indian troops have moved into Ladakh (with most 
being stationed in and around Leh) (Loram, 2004). The pervasive army presence 
continues to this day. This has resulted in significant population increases, particularly in 
Leh, and changes to water user needs and increased water demands. The different food 
crop preferences of the Indian army encouraged a shift in Ladakhi agricultural 
production, away from traditional crops (such as barley), and toward cash crops (such as 
potatoes and vegetables) that could be sold to the army. This placed further stress on 
already limited water resources, beyond the effect of the population increase, because the 
new crops require more water to grow than the traditional Ladakhi crops.
Additionally, the new roads facilitated trade with the rest of India, bringing in a 
host of new products, subsidized food stuffs, as well as new ideas about modernization 
and development. As chapter two showed, at this time, the Indian state was pursuing a 
development strategy based on central state efforts to foster industrial modernization, and 
it was this definition of development that was introduced in Ladakh. The new roads also 
allowed the introduction of tourism into Ladakh. Since 1974, when Ladakh opened up to 
tourism, there has been a steady rise in the influx of tourists, with the number surging 
from 18,000 annually in 2000 to 43,508 in 2006, breaking the previous year’s record
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(J&K Tourism Department, 2006). Tourism led to further changes in previous livelihood 
patterns. With the rising numbers of tourists has come the rising demand for goods 
outside the scope of the local economy, namely food preferences akin to those of the 
army (Tiwari & Gupta, 2003). Tourists have not only increased the number of water 
users, placing increased demands on the water system, but they have also placed new 
water demands on the system. For example, the proliferation of tourist-specific amenities 
such as, flush toilets, showers, and sinks, have permitted a profligate use of water, which 
was previously unheard of in Ladakhi society. These tourist demands have not only 
placed a significant additional strain on already scarce water supplies, but have also led to 
significant contamination of the water. The flushing of chemicals and human excrement 
into the water supply has left the streams in and around Leh no longer fit to drink from, 
and water-borne illnesses are on the rise. Solid waste, from plastic water bottles to 
processed and packaged food wrappers, previously non-existent in Ladakh, can now be 
found piled up in the streets, landfills, and clogging the water channels (see 
Figure 18). As it has becomes ever-more difficult to exclude ‘outsiders,’ problems of 
overuse, such as these, have become more difficult to monitor, control, and contain.
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Figure 18: Solid waste in Leh yura.
The diversified livelihood opportunities brought about by the presence of both the 
Indian army and tourism in Ladakh led to a transition from an economy based on herding, 
agriculture and trade to an economy based on cash. The emerging cash economy, fostered 
urbanization, particularly to Leh, by drawing people away from farms and into town, in 
order to seek paid employment, and the greater economic prosperity that jobs in the 
service sector promised. As a result of the subsidized food imports, and the strong push 
for modernization, local agriculture became less attractive and so there has been little 
incentive to continue farming (Page, 1993). This substantial population growth in Leh 
from the army, tourists, and the process of urbanization has had a profound effect on 
Ladakh’s system of communal water management. As a result, more people have to 
share a finite amount of water; the same amount of water now has to be split in so many 
extra ways. Some scholars have argued that, in the past, Ladakhis have been able to
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maintain a harmonious balance with their environment, due to the practice of fraternal 
polyandry (the marriage of one woman to more than one brother), combined with the 
practice of sending away at least one child to pursue monastic education, and the practice 
of primogeniture (the system of inheritance or succession by the firstborn, specifically the 
eldest son). Polyandry in particular, limited population growth (while maintaining “a 
labor force within the household large enough to carry out labor-intensive subsistence 
agriculture”), by constraining fertility, in order to maintain a balance between population 
and constrained resources (Wiley, 1997:279). When new economic opportunities arose, 
with the arrival of the military and tourism, sons who did not desire to join a polyandrous 
union, were enabled to leave the family, and pursue livelihood alternatives elsewhere 
(Wiley, 1997). Where previously the economic situation in Ladakh presented virtually 
no alternatives to polyandry, now the availability of choice has diminished the 
predominance of this practice, and thus there no longer exists a strong population limiting 
mechanism. The population of Leh town rose from a mere “2,895 persons in 1911 to 
3,720 in 1961” (Tiwari & Gupta, 2003:3). As of the 2001 census, Leh hosts a population 
of 28,639, not including the transient or temporary residents (army, tourists, migrants), 
which only continues to soar (DSEA, 2006:32). In one respect, churpuns in Leh have 
borne the brunt of this increase in water scarcity, as when water is more scarce, their 
responsibilities become more difficult. However, in another respect, as more people in 
Leh stop farming, and instead pursue paid employment, there may be fewer fields that 
need irrigation, and thus churpuns’ work possibly decreases.
As a result of the diversification of livelihoods, people in Leh began to have jobs 
or businesses to run, and so became unable to devote the required amount of time to
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fulfill their churpun duties. The position of the churpun came to be seen as burdensome, 
and consequently, it came to be assumed on a tum-by-tum basis in 1965. Since 1999, all 
households in Leh are required, by rotation, to assume the role of churpun. As a result of 
this rotational system, the churpuns are no longer selected according to their ability to 
manage the irrigation system, and, accordingly, not all churpuns possess the requisite 
leadership attributes to effectively carry out their responsibilities. Further, the practice of 
employing migrant workers as churpuns, from the Bihar state of India or Nepal, who are 
obviously not familiar with the functioning of the system, has led to problems and 
disputes (Tiwari & Gupta, 2003). Consequently, the effectiveness and the longevity of 
the communal water management system in Leh is in grave jeopardy.
Additionally, the diversification of livelihoods has had a strong impact on 
communal water management at the village level. In both Leh and outlying villages, all 
family members have traditionally lived in the same household and worked their family 
fields together. Now, many husbands and children are leaving the villages to go live, 
work, and attend school in urban centres, such as Leh. As a result of this process of 
urbanization, many village households now have an acute labour shortage. As they try to 
hang on to farming (usually left to the women of the older generations), most of these 
households have few other options but to import Indian and Nepali labourers. The past 
success of Ladakh’s water management has been facilitated in part due to dense social 
networks between water users, which have led to increased trust between water users. 
These labourers are not part of the villages’ dense social networks, and because they are 
outsiders, there exists an increased potential for distrust toward them by the other 
villagers; distrust amongst water users does not facilitate the successful management of
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water. Furthermore, outside labourers, generally, do not know about the community 
norms regarding water polluting. For example, Ladakhis use dry composting toilets (that 
turn human excreta into rich organic manure) whereas most other Indians use water for 
their sanitation needs. Participants in Alchi complained that migrant workers were 
washing their bodies and clothes in the tokpo, and using it as a toilet. Though it appears 
that the quantity of water Ladakhi’s receive is still sufficient to meet their individual 
needs, the quality of the water in villages is now being called into question.
The push for modernization has been accompanied by the notions of the 
importance of formal school education and the stigmatization of farming. As a result, 
there has been an overwhelming trend for Ladakhi families to send their children to 
school. Children who attend village schools, are away from the household and farm 
through the day, but still contribute to the family tasks in the evenings, and on weekends. 
Where village schools do not exist, or where families have the means to afford ‘better’ 
schooling, children are sent to boarding schools in urban centres, and therefore do not 
contribute to the family tasks. As children leave the land to participate in formal 
education, and eventually the cash economy, they do not acquire the traditional 
education, which includes knowledge of the communal water management system. 
Participants in both Alchi and Saboo expressed the concern over the longevity of the 
system. One Saboo participant explained that whereas knowledge of the role of the 
churpun was traditionally passed down from generation to generation, now the younger 
generation is not interested in learning the old ways. At present, only the elders know all 
the yuras and which fields belong to each family, so when it is a person’s turn to be 
churpun they lack the requisite knowledge to manage the irrigation system and
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consequently must go to the elders for assistance. Once the elders die (within the next 
10-20 years), there is a strong fear within the older generation that the traditional system 
will fall apart.
Further, as the predominance of agriculture diminishes, and houses are built 
where fields once grew, the rationale for maintaining the communal water management 
system also diminishes. Ladakh’s communal water management system is premised on 
the widespread practice of agriculture, and supported by the fact that the social benefit of 
the system is approximately equal to the sum of each household’s benefit; in the past, this 
encouraged households to participate in the upkeep and management of the system 
because their mutual efforts resulted in mutual benefits. If a time comes when fields are 
no longer being irrigated to grow crops, then there will no longer be a need for the 
system. Even if a portion of the population does not abandon agriculture, those 
households who do, no longer have the same incentive to contribute to the upkeep and 
management. In Chemray, for example, the system of the pabchu has only worked 
because there have been enough volunteers to stand watch over the yuras. If households 
were to cease their contributions to the pabchu nightwatch duties, then the likelihood that 
the water resource will be properly monitored decreases, and opportunities for overuse 
and free-riding increase.
Traditionally, family members lived together in the same household and 
landholdings were kept intact, though recently, as a result of urbanization and 
modernization, families are splitting into ever-smaller nuclear units, and likewise their 
landholdings are being split into smaller and smaller pieces (Page, 1993). New houses 
are built where fields once grew, and even if children do not move away from their
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families in the village to urban areas, the recent trend has been to move into these 
separate dwellings. Commercialization, which tends to increase income differentiation in 
communities, also appears to be “destroying the social fabric of communities, replacing 
traditional principles of cooperation with those of competition and causing resource 
deterioration” (Dolsak, & Ostrom, 2003:18). As community ties are weakened and 
competition increases, the old system of mutual aid, that formerly permeated all aspects 
of Ladakhi society, is at risk of breaking down. “Groups with longer traditions of mutual 
trust and close-knit communities that enable resource users to reciprocate behaviour are 
more likely than other groups to succeed in devising and sustaining successful 
institutions” (Dolsak, & Ostrom, 2003:6). The long-enduring success of Ladakh’s 
communal system of water management can, in part, be attributed to the Ladakhi societal 
nature of cooperation and mutual support. However, in addition to the communal system 
of water management, voluntary systems of shared labour and resources, such as the 
pashpun, bes, rares, and lhangsde, have now come under threat; “now that everyone’s 
gone off looking for paid jobs, you can’t get any help with ploughing or harvesting 
without paying for it” (Page, 1993). Thus, as family members move away and live apart, 
and neighbours become engaged with other activities, water users no longer maintain 
frequent face-to-face communication and the dense social networks, that once facilitated 
the success of the water management institution, begin to deteriorate.
This weakening is further compounded by a loss of self-reliance due to an ever­
growing dependence on the government. As previously mentioned, in earlier times, 
repair and maintenance of the entire system was completely carried out by the 
community. Nowadays, minor repairs and maintenance, such as repairing yuras, are still
118
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
undertaken by the community, however, dependence on external assistance has grown, 
such that major repairs and maintenance (i.e. the repair of zings), are undertaken by the 
local administration. In Alchi, for example, villagers have been awaiting assistance while 
their zing has been in disrepair for about three years. In places where contractors have 
been sent to undertake repairs, more modem materials, such as cement, are used, rather 
than the traditional, and locally available, stones and mud. When these cement repairs 
themselves need repairing, Ladakhis no longer have the ability and materials necessary to 
repair the infrastructure. There is a fear that these new, cement structures are not going to 
last anywhere as long as the old ones, thereby threatening the sustainability of the 
physical system. Since the new structures will not be able to be repaired using local 
materials, the government will have to be relied upon even for minor repairs, 
perpetuating further this dependence. Additionally, one participant reported that in Leh, 
with the establishment of the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council in 1995, 
this government assistance is now within closer reach, which has only served to 
exacerbate this tendency. Though these changes have not completely overwhelmed 
Ladakhi society, and thus the communal water management system, the continued 
effectiveness and longevity of the system remains uncertain.
These external factors, while more apparent and intense in Leh, were prevalent in 
all villages investigated in this case study. Consequently, the question of proximity to 
Leh did not seem to be a factor in maintaining the integrity of the traditional water 
management system as, even in Hemis Shukpachan, the furthest village from Leh 
(approximately 85 kilometres away), the effects of these external factors were witnessed. 
Likewise, direction from Leh, did not appear to be factor in maintaining the integrity of
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the traditional water management system, nor did the altitude or aspect of a particular 
village. What did seem to be a factor, however, was the water source, and therefore the 
amount of water available to a particular community. For example, no glaciers are 
located above Alchi, and instead Alchi’s water is dependent on the previous winter’s 
snowfall. As a result, Alchi suffers from a chronic shortage of water, but the limited 
supply of water forces Alchi to be judicious in the distribution of water and follow a 
precise and regimented irrigation schedule. It can thus be generally surmised that, 
Alchi’s chronic water shortage has kept its rules strictly enforced and traditional water 
management system strongly intact. Similarly, Chemray’s close proximity to another 
community, resulting in the necessity to share water with the other community, seems to 
have served to strengthen both the internal management of water within the village 
boundaries, and the management of water between the two villages.
If all these aforementioned external factors were not enough, climate change also 
poses a significant challenge to the viability of sustaining Ladakh’s communal water 
management institution, presently and into the future. As a result of climate change, 
temperatures around the globe have been increasingly rising. Warming is having 
profound affects on many ecosystems around the world, however the melting of 
mountain glaciers is of particular relevance to this research.
The Himalayan Glaciers on the Tibetan Plateau have been among the most 
affected by global warming. The Himalayas ... provide more than half of the 
drinking water for 40% of the world’s population -  through seven Asian river 
systems [the Indus River, Ganges River, Brahmaputra River, Salween River, 
Yangtze River, Mekong River, and Yellow River] that all originate on the
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same plateau. Within the next half-century, that 40% of the world’s people 
may well face a very serious drinking water shortage, unless the world acts 
boldly and quickly to mitigate global warming. (Gore, 2006:58)
One participant reported that, over his lifetime, he had personally witnessed the reduction 
of the glaciers visible from his home in Skara, on the outskirts of Leh, by nearly half their 
size. At the time of the interview, he was 67 years old, which provides evidence of the 
rapid pace of change that is taking place. In addition to the reduction in glacial size, 
rising temperatures will cause snow and ice on mountain peaks to melt earlier than 
normal and at greater rates. This advancement in the timing of glacier and snowmelt, and 
the subsequent changes in meltwater runoff rates and seasonality will have serious 
consequences for populations, like Ladakhis, who rely on agriculture for their livelihoods 
(Gore, 2006). In dry (arid or semi-arid) regions like Ladakh, even small changes can put 
significant stress on water supplies. “Those living in fragile deserts and on 
mountainsides are most vulnerable to climatic and environmental changes wrought by 
pressure of people on the land, deforestation, soil erosion, and disruptions to river flows 
from dams and upstream pipelines” (Black, 2004b: 131).
“These changes will be further complicated by shifts in precipitation regimes and 
a possible intensification and increased frequency of hydrologic events” (Gore, 
2006:264). These predicted effects are already being observed in Ladakh. Though the 
data available is limited, Figure 19 clearly depicts the recent trends in precipitation in 
Leh. Annual rainfall is on the increase (besides an aberration in 2005). Unfortunately, at 
the time the data was collected, 2006 data was unavailable. However, due to the heavy, 
and reportedly unprecedented, rainfall directly observed by the researcher during the
121
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
350 6
I  ■  A N N U A L  S N O W F A L L  ( m m )  
S
O  M O N T H S  W IT H  RAINFALL
■  A N N U A L  RAINFALL ( m m )
■  TOTA L A N N U A L PR E C IPIT A T IO N  
( m m )
2002 2003 2004 2005
Y e a r
Figure 19: Recent precipitation trends in Leh.
Note: Raw meteorological data from Field Research Laboratory, 2006.
period of field work, the annual rainfall for 2006 was undoubtedly higher than that of 
2004. Despite an anomaly in 2004, both the annual snowfall and the total annual 
precipitation are also on the rise. Additionally, the number of months per year 
experiencing rainfall is growing. Not only is the number of months in which rain is 
falling noteworthy, but also the month during which the majority of the rain is falling. 
For example, in 2003, the month of May experienced the heaviest rainfall. At this time 
of year, the crops require significant watering, and therefore the rainfall is welcomed. 
The worry though is that the concentrated rain could cause the erosion of the topsoil. In 
2004, most of the year’s rain fell during the month of October, which has dire 
consequences for crops. By October, all the crops are harvested and rainfall is no longer 
vital; it is during the growing months when crops need that rainfall. In 2005, July 
experienced the brunt of the year’s rainfall and as a result, fields were flattened by the 
weight of the rainwater and crops were waterlogged. Again in 2006, the months of July
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and August experienced extremely heavy rains which had devastating effects on crop 
yields and livestock, not to mention houses, water infrastructure (particularly yuras and 
zings), roads, bridges, and the like.
Regarding the possible intensification and increased frequency of hydrologic 
events, Ladakh has already begun to observe those as well. The incessant heavy rainfall 
during the summer of 2006 (July 24 -  August 22) triggered flash floods which affected 
almost the entirety of the region of Ladakh (Anderson, 2006). In particular, 20 villages in 
Ladakh were submerged (see Figure 20). As a result of these severe floods causing 
houses to collapse, at least nineteen people were killed, and many more injured (The 
Tribune, 2006). Over 800 people were evacuated and taken to safer areas, namely to five 
tented camps (Anderson, 2006). The flooding also caused landslides, which washed 
away roads, left 22 bridges broken and closed the Leh-Srinagar highway for days (United 
Nations Development Program, 2006).
Figure 20: House submerged by flooding in the village of Rong, Nubra Block.
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A further phenomenon resulting from climate change is that mosquitoes are now 
climbing to higher elevations, thereby increasing human vulnerability to new and 
unfamiliar diseases. “Before 1970, cold temperatures caused freezing at high elevations 
and limited mosquitoes and mosquito-borne illnesses to lower elevations. Today, 
increased warmth has caused some mosquitoes and mosquito-borne diseases to migrate to 
higher altitudes” (Gore, 2006:173). Historically, mosquitoes, and mosquito-borne 
illnesses, like Malaria and Dengue Fever, were unheard of in Ladakh. They did not exist. 
Now, however, mosquitoes are beginning to appear in Ladakh. The presence of 
mosquitoes in Ladakh was observed during the research period.
4.5 Overcoming Challenges
Given the pressing challenges described in section 4.4, the research sought to 
address if and how these challenges could be overcome. For common-pool resource 
management institutions to be successful, they must be able to adapt to changing 
circumstances (Dietz et al., 2003). However, adaptability is difficult if change transpires 
too quickly. Thus, when “rates of change in resources, resource-user populations, 
technology, and economic and social conditions are moderate” institutional effectiveness 
is facilitated (Dietz et al., 2003:1908).
Examples of Ladakh’s communal water management system adapting to 
accommodate changing circumstances were noted. In Alchi, Saboo, and Leh, increased 
churpun responsibility, resulting from water scarcity, increased cultivation, and 
population pressures, have led to the increase in the number of churpuns necessary to 
manage the water in each of these communities. In 1965, as a direct result of the growing 
unwillingness among people to continue to carry-out the role of the churpun, a rotational
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system was instituted in Leh. Then in 1971, as a result of an acute shortage of water in 
Leh, the water distribution rules were adjusted to ameliorate former deficiencies. In 
1984, cash payment of churpuns in Leh was instituted as an incentive to have this 
important role filled. Most recently, the rotational system instituted in 1965 was 
amended to include new households in Leh that had emerged as a result of land 
fragmentation; as of 1999, each household in Leh must serve by rotation as churpun.
New indigenous technology has also been developed in Ladakh to address water 
scarcity, in particular during the critical seed-sowing period in early spring. Artificial 
glaciers have been developed that permit the freezing of water in artificial terraced 
structures at mid-altitudes. Water, that would otherwise be ‘wasted’ as it trickles to lower 
elevations, is channelled to these structures in the fall, where they are frozen through the 
winter; the artificial glaciers melt earlier in the spring than the higher natural glaciers, 
because their structures are strategically built at lower altitudes and thus they are exposed 
to rising temperatures first. This technique can be used to provide much needed water 
during the critical sowing period in early spring, which mitigates water scarcity, and 
increases the possibility of having two consecutive harvests in one agricultural season. 
This technology also results in the additional benefit of increasing spring and 
groundwater recharge (Leh Nutrition Project, 2006).
These examples show that both the institutional and technological aspects of 
Ladakh’s communal water management system have adapted to the changing external 
conditions that it faces. Just because adaptations are taking place though, does not 
necessarily mean that the long-term viability of the system will be assured. For example, 
while the decision to adopt a rotational system of churpun selection in Leh was made in
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an attempt to achieve equity, it inadvertently has impacted the management quality of the 
system. In Leh, the churpuns were formerly selected based on merit qualities and 
appointed by goba. Now that the rotational system is in place, the churpuns are 
appointed based on a household’s turn, and not necessarily on their ability to undertake 
the churpun duties. Further, the cash payment of the churpun means that some people 
hire third-parties to fulfill their churpun obligations if they are too busy with other, more 
profitable opportunities. Unfortunately, it appears that quality is suffering at the expense 
of equity.
Based on the data acquired, it is not possible to say whether Ladakh’s communal 
water management system will last into the future. As it stands right now, the communal 
water management system remains quite entrenched in Ladakhi society. However, the 
pace of change that Ladakh is undergoing is rapid, and attributable to many external 
factors (Goodall, 2004). Some of these external factors, such as climate change, are 
global in scope, and thus beyond the means of Ladakhis alone to overcome. Other 
factors though are certainly within the means of Ladakhis to address and overcome. For 
success to continue, in the face of such rapid changes and influences, Ladakh’s 
institutions must be able to sustain this adaptation into the future.
4.6 Into the Future: The Wav Forward
Finally, the research sought to determine what the Ladakhi experience could offer 
other communities. “The best available knowledge strongly suggests that the search for a 
single best strategy will be futile,” however, this case study, and a rich body of other case 
studies, has shown that depending on the characteristics of the resource and of the users, 
communal institutions can be the preferred choice for ensuring the sustainable
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management of common-pool resources (Dietz et al, 2002:25). The ‘best practices’ that 
can be elucidated out of this, and other, case studies, and potentially transferred to other 
communities struggling to achieve more effective water management, are the notions of 
economic efficiency, sustainability, equity, accountability and adaptability that are 
inherent in many communal property management regimes (Dietz et al, 2002).
Ladakh’s system appears particularly strong with respect to sustainability, equity, 
and accountability. Ladakhis have long recognized that their very existence demands the 
sustainable use of their water resources, and this awareness is embedded into every aspect 
of their institutional arrangement. Ladakh’s communal water management is sustainable 
because it is endogenously developed, and for the most part, is still not dependent on 
external financial or material resources for its upkeep. Ladakhis use local building 
materials and reverence of water is a community norm. In these ways, the institution 
achieves ecological harmony with the fragile ecosystem that is Ladakh. Equity is 
fostered by a spirit of communalism, by equitable participation, by the way the position 
of churpun is appointed (to ensure that no one monopolizes this critical post), and by the 
way water is distributed (to ensure that each farmer receives adequate quantities of water 
for their needs) (Agarwal & Narain, 1997). Accountability is achieved through 
community participation, and an elaborate system of norms and rules to regulate who can 
use the water, how they can use it, and who can be excluded.
While the Ladakhi experience is not perfect, and its communal water management 
system faces challenges, it does provide a treasure trove of knowledge for other 
communities seeking to more effectively manage their water resources. Communities 
seeking to utilize this knowledge must recognize that Ladakh’s communal water
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management system cannot, and should not, be copied in toto, and that part of Ladakh’s 
success has been the ability to craft a system specifically tailored to their unique 
circumstances; however, once this is acknowledged, the case of Ladakh can provide 
useful suggestions for the establishment or improvement of a community’s communal 
water management system.
The world needs a revolution in the way we manage water resources. The Earth’s 
water must be shared between people in different regions and different nations, but also 
between humans and nature. A wealth of knowledge exists throughout the world of how 
to best manage water resources in specific contexts -  the Ladakhi experience is one 
example of this knowledge. The question for the global community is whether we have 
the ability and willingness to implement this knowledge in order to improve the 
management of our water resources. We simply cannot wait for the next generation to do 
it for us. As we wait, knowledge disappears and people die. The time is now.
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APPENDIX
Sample of questions asked during interviews:
1) How many households/people inhabit this village?
2) How many chutsos are in this village? What are the names of the chutsos?
3) How many churpuns are in this village?
4) How is/are the churpuns appointed? By whom? How often?
5) What are the churpun’s responsibilities/duties?
6) Has the churpun been active during this agricultural season? Last season?
7) When do the churpun’s duties begin and end?
8) Is the churpun compensated? If so, in what form? How much? By whom?
9) What is the penalty for someone caught stealing water? Polluting water?
10) What are the sources of water here? Which chutsos utilize each source?
11) Where do people get their drinking water from? What about during winter?
12) Do you think the water is safe to drink? If not, why not?
13) Have you heard of people in this village getting sick from drinking the water?
14) Are there hand-pumps in the village? How many? How long have they been 
there? Who built/financed them? Who maintains them? What is the source of 
water for the hand-pumps? Do they freeze in winter?
15) Is there a piped-water system in this village? How long has it been there? Who 
built/financed it? Who maintains it? What is the source of water for the piped 
system? Does it freeze in winter?
16) How many zings are in this village? Are the zings still in use? If so, when?
17) Who maintains/repairs the zings? The yuras?
18) When does the agricultural season begin and end? What crops are grown here?
19) In what order do fields receive irrigation? How is the order determined?
20) How much water does each field receive? How is the quantity determined?
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